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  ABSTRACT 
The financial crisis of 2008 and other monetary embarrassments like Enron and WorldCom 
elevated worldwide enthusiasm for improving the chronicled two passage pass/fail 
institutionalized audit report, necessitating development of an expanded audit report in 
accordance with the issuance of ISA 700, The Independent Auditor's Report on Financial 
Statements, that are conveyed in a way that is meaningful, available and important to the users 
of financial statements. As for the enhanced audit report, standard setters chose to command 
the exposure of more review explicit subtitles like the Key Audit Matters (KAMs)in reaction 
to developing worries about the value of the audit report (ISA 701, IAASB 2015; PCAOB 
2017).These additional communications were expected to further improve the communicative 
value of the auditor’s report by, among others, helping “investors and other users of financial 
statement focus on aspects of the financial statements that the auditor also found to be 
challenging” (PCAOB 2013) and giving a guide to users to all the more likely explore complex 
financial reports and spotlight them on issues important to their decision making" (IAASB). 
The research study sought to establish what determines the KAMs reported in the independent 
auditor’s report as proposed by IAASB and PCAOB in 2013, and by extension the auditors’ 
judgement in deciding form and number of KAMs to report. The study utilized semi-structured 
questionnaire for data collection using purposive sampling of 136 respondents from auditors 
of firms listed with NSE to ascertain nature and form of KAMs being reported. The research 
adopted descriptive research statistics like scores and frequencies in analysing findings from 
primary data collected aided by Statistical Package for Social Scientists (SPSS) Version 
23.Spearman`s rho was used to test for relations among the variables. Findings were presented 
in frequency tables, pie charts and graphs. The major findings revealed positive relationships 
between KAMs and its drivers. The number and nature of KAMs were moderately correlated 
to the firm size and trend of reporting over years, positively and strongly correlated to 
subsidiaries, auditor type, cross listing status and the industry in which firm operates. Basically, 
the main drivers of KAMs reported are the international standards and legislations developed 
for various jurisdictions are general in nature hence giving leeway to auditors’ judgement and 
justification of inclusion or omission of KAMs in the report. The study therefore recommends 
the need to develop guidelines on the forms, format and number of key audit matters reported 
in auditor’s report as well as the need to harmonize the reporting of Key audit matters across 
the industry to prevent users of audited annual reports from misinformation. This is on the 
grounds that the big four audit firms will in general have their own specific manner of 








TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DECLARATION ....................................................................................................................... ii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ....................................................................................................... iii 
ABSTRACT .............................................................................................................................. iv 
LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................................................. viii 
LIST OF FIGURES .................................................................................................................. ix 
ABREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ..................................................................................... x 
CHAPTER ONE ........................................................................................................................ 1 
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1. Background of the study ................................................................................................. 1 
1.1.1. Key Audit Matters ....................................................................................................... 5 
1.2. Problem Statement .......................................................................................................... 7 
1.3. Research Objectives ........................................................................................................ 8 
1.3.1. Main Objective ............................................................................................................ 8 
1.3.2. Specific Objective ....................................................................................................... 8 
1.4. Research Questions ......................................................................................................... 8 
1.5. Scope of the study ........................................................................................................... 9 
1.6. Limitation of the Study ................................................................................................... 9 
1.7. Significance of the Study ................................................................................................ 9 
1.7.1. Firms’ Stakeholders................................................................................................... 10 
1.7.2. Academia ................................................................................................................... 10 
1.7.3. Regulators, standards and professional bodies .......................................................... 10 
CHAPTER TWO ..................................................................................................................... 12 
LITERATURE REVIEW ........................................................................................................ 12 
2.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................... 12 
2.2. Theoretical Literature Review ...................................................................................... 12 
2.2.1. The Theory of Inspired Confidence .......................................................................... 12 
2.2.2. Signaling Theory ....................................................................................................... 14 
2.2.3. The Agency Theory ................................................................................................... 16 
2.3. Empirical Literature Review ......................................................................................... 18 
2.3.1. Content of KAMs reported in the enhanced auditors report of listed companies in 
NSE 18 
2.3.2. Drivers associated with the content of KAMs reported by companies listed in the 
NSE 22 
2.3.3. Nature and number of KAMs reported in enhanced audit reports of companies listed 
in NSE 25 
2.4. Conceptual Framework ................................................................................................. 27 
2.4.1. Company Size ........................................................................................................... 28 
2.4.2. Subsidiaries ............................................................................................................... 28 
2.4.3. Auditors Type ............................................................................................................ 29 
2.4.4. Cross listing Status .................................................................................................... 29 
2.4.5. Industry...................................................................................................................... 29 
2.4.6. Trend Review over Years .......................................................................................... 30 
2.5. Operationalization of Key Variables ............................................................................ 30 
2.6. Research Gap ................................................................................................................ 32 
2.7. Chapter summary .......................................................................................................... 33 
vi 
 
CHAPTER THREE ................................................................................................................. 34 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................. 34 
3.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................... 34 
3.2. Research Philosophy ..................................................................................................... 34 
3.3. Research Design ............................................................................................................ 34 
3.4. Population ..................................................................................................................... 35 
3.5. Sampling Techniques .................................................................................................... 35 
3.6. Pilot Study ..................................................................................................................... 37 
3.7. Data Collection Methods .............................................................................................. 37 
3.8. Data Analysis ................................................................................................................ 38 
3.8.1. Testing the Models .................................................................................................... 39 
3.8.2. Diagnostic Tests ........................................................................................................ 40 
3.9. Reliability and Validity of the Research Model ........................................................... 41 
3.10. Data Presentation ....................................................................................................... 41 
3.11. Ethical Issues ............................................................................................................. 41 
CHAPTER FOUR .................................................................................................................... 43 
FINDINGS AND DATA ANALYSIS .................................................................................... 43 
4.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................... 43 
4.2. Demographic Information ............................................................................................. 43 
4.2.1. Gender of respondents ............................................................................................... 43 
4.2.2. Age of respondents .................................................................................................... 44 
4.2.3. Highest level of education ......................................................................................... 45 
4.2.4. Type of audit firm worked on ................................................................................... 45 
4.2.5. Years of experience ................................................................................................... 46 
4.2.6. Audit committee ........................................................................................................ 46 
4.2.7. Effects of KAMs in Audit quality ............................................................................. 47 
4.3. The content of KAMs reported by auditors in the enhanced auditors’ report .............. 47 
4.4. Drivers associated with reported KAMs by companies ................................................ 48 
4.4.1. Firm size .................................................................................................................... 49 
4.4.2. Subsidiaries ............................................................................................................... 49 
4.4.3. Auditor's type ............................................................................................................ 50 
4.4.4. Cross listing status ..................................................................................................... 51 
4.4.5. Industry...................................................................................................................... 52 
4.4.6. Trend review over years ............................................................................................ 52 
4.5. The nature and number KAMs reported in the enhanced audit reports ........................ 53 
4.6. Inferential analysis ........................................................................................................ 53 
4.6.2. Correlation testing ..................................................................................................... 55 
4.6.3. Goodness of fit of the model ..................................................................................... 56 
4.6.4. Regression analysis ................................................................................................... 57 
4.7. Chapter Summary ......................................................................................................... 58 
CHAPTER FIVE ..................................................................................................................... 59 
DISCUSSION, SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .................. 59 
5.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................... 59 
5.2. Discussion of Findings .................................................................................................. 59 
5.2.1. The content of KAMs reported by auditors in the enhanced auditors’ report ........... 59 
5.2.2. Drivers associated with reported KAMs by companies listed in the NSE ................ 60 
vii 
 
5.2.3. The nature and number KAMs reported in the enhanced audit reports .................... 61 
5.3. Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 62 
5.4. Recommendations ......................................................................................................... 63 
5.5. Limitations of the research ............................................................................................ 63 
5.6. Contribution to Knowledge........................................................................................... 63 
5.7. Suggested areas for further research ............................................................................. 64 
REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................ 65 
APPENDICES ......................................................................................................................... 73 
APPENDIX I: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION ............................................................... 73 





LIST OF TABLES 
Table 2.1: Operationalization of Variables .............................................................................. 30 
Table 4.1: Highest level of education ...................................................................................... 45 
Table 4.2: Contribution of KAMs on audit quality .................................................................. 47 
Table 4.3: Level of agreement with statements regarding effects of firm size on KAMs ....... 49 
Table 4.4: Level of agreement with statements regarding effects of subsidiaries on KAMs .. 50 
Table 4.5: Level of agreement with statements regarding effects of auditor's type on KAMs 51 
Table 4.6: Level of agreement with statements regarding effects of cross listing status on 
KAMs ....................................................................................................................................... 51 
Table 4.7: Level of agreement with statements regarding effects of industry on KAMs ........ 52 
Table 4.8: Level of agreement with statements regarding effects of cross section of year on 


















LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 2.1: Conceptual Framework…....................................................................................32 
Figure 4.1: Distribution of respondents by gender .................................................................. 43 
Figure 4.2: Distribution of respondents by age ........................................................................ 44 
Figure 4.3: Type of audit firm respondents ever worked for ................................................... 45 
Figure 4.4: Years of experience ............................................................................................... 46 






















ABREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
BAC  Board Audit Committee 
CAM  Critical Audit Matters 
CMA   Capital Markets Authority 
CCGSI Code of Corporate Governance 
GAAPs Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
IAASB  International Audit &Assurance Standard Board  
IFRSs     International Financial Reporting Standards 
IOSCO International Organization of Securities Commission 
ISA    International Standards of Audit  
KAM   Key Audit Matters 
NSE   Nairobi Stock Exchange  
PCAOB  Public Company Accounting Oversight Board  
SAS  Statement of Auditing Standards 













1.1. Background of the study 
The audit profession has progressively gone through a series of attacks from various quarters, 
in light of its two-paragraph pass/fail standardized audit report (Smith, 2002). This has 
necessitated significant transformation in the last decade, aiming at achieving value addition in 
the communicative nature of financial reports to their users. This prompted the requirement for 
change and amendment of audit reporting (Bédard, Gonthier-Besacier and Schatt, 2015). The 
worldwide financial crisis expanded the need for standard setters to create proposals for 
improving the review work so as to increase financial steadiness. One of the thoughts was to 
expand the audit report disclosure to the general population, to guarantee that it is fit for reason. 
The changes were driven by the enduring discussions on the structure, substance and value of 
the audit report (Commission on Auditor's Responsibilities 1978; Geiger 1993; Church et al. 
2008; Smieliauskas et al. 2008; Mock et al. 2013). Specifically, the institutionalized structure 
and restrictive substance of the past review report had been found to constrain its 
communicative and informative value (Coram et al. 2011; Vanstraelen et al. 2012). 
 
A central role of independent audits is to build the unwavering quality of reliability of financial 
statements, for example the reason for audit review is to lend higher believability to financial 
reports by verifying accounting information as prepared by management (Nowell, Norris, 
White and Moules, 2017). As indicated by ISA 200, audit reviews are mainly meant to enhance 
degree of confidence of intended users in the financial statements and as a result expanding 
their dimension of unwavering reliability which isn't available in unaudited financial reports. 
The IAASB henceforth communicated that the key reason for its new and changed audit 
reporting standards is to re-establish and upgrade the confidence of users in the audited 
financial statements (IAASB, 2015; Bédard, Coram, Espahbodi, and Mock, 2016;Craig, 
Smieliauskas, and Amernic 2017). 
 
Already, the Auditing Practices Board had presented SAS 600 trying to educate users on 
specific issues relating to auditors role, in a bid to lessen users’ misconception. The justification 
for the amendment, framed as an endeavour to lessen users’ expectations gap, was started on 
the supposition that audit review report can be utilized to educate users about the obligations 
and duties of auditors and directors (Behzadian and Nia, 2012). Verifiable in this, was a thought 
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that convictions held by users with regards to the idea of auditors obligations and duties are 
wrong and that if those perspectives can be corrected in line with those of the profession, audit 
expectations gap will be decreased. This, be that as it may, appeared not to address the desire 
hole fully, thus the lines requirement for upgrade of the structure, substance, and nature of audit 
report. 
 
Prior to enhancement of the independent auditors report by standard setters, the substantive 
part of the audit report was a brief statement by the auditors, that could take any of the following 
four forms of audit report depending on auditors findings: qualified opinion, where the auditor 
felt that there was significant reason to believe that the financial reports were materially 
misstated, was unable to establish the impact of a given significant uncertainty or the going 
concern of the organization was in doubt. The auditor report could also give an adverse opinion, 
whereby despite getting all relevant information for his/her audit, the auditor concludes that 
the misstatement of the books is both significant and pandemic to the financial statements (Li, 
Hay & Lau, 2018). Also, the auditor could give a disclaimer of opinion in cases whereby in the 
course of his audit work, he felt that vital information that could have impact on the financial 
reports was unavailable and could have been instrumental in him/her forming an opinion about 
the financial reports of the organization (Quick & Schmidt, 2018). Lastly, the auditor could 
give an unqualified audit opinion where having reviewed the financial reports of the 
organization, he had no reservations concerning the financial reporting hence meaning the 
financial reports were a fair representation of the company and that the going concern of the 
organization  for the foreseeable future was not in doubt (Quick, Schmidt& Thompson, 2014). 
 
The audit report format then, despite being short form, easy to read and comprehend by both 
professional and non-professional users of financial reports, was very brief. The auditor’s voice 
could not be heard in matters to do with the actual audit work conducted, challenges 
encountered and auditor’s opinion on matters that are not necessarily material to warrant 
change of opinion but could impact on the decision making of the user of the financial reports 
if pointed out. Whereas there are many standards used by auditors in their work and form a 
foundation to support audit report, most of the ISAs provide a framework for judgement hence 
need for auditors’ voice to be heard in the audit report. As indicated by Humphrey (1997), 
"auditing isn't viewed as a precise science, intended to determine to 100 percent exactness the 
data presented in financial reports. It is more a procedure of judgment, aimed at guaranteeing 
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that data is sensibly exact, genuine and reasonable, true and fair, adequate as opposed to 
outright". 
 
The International Audit & Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) proposal came after noticing 
that user’s confidence in audit quality has continuously dwindled. However, there are afew  
respondents who raised pertinent issues in regards to the implementation process of Key Audit 
Matters (KAMs), and the effect it will have on audit reporting (Kachelmeier et al., 2017). There 
has been evidence of material differences in perception between auditors and users in regards 
to kind of message conveyed by the audit report and hence need for enhancement. 
 
So as to react to the quest by users for more information on issues essential to comprehension 
of audited financial statements and the audit report, the International Auditing and Assurance 
Standards, during a meeting convened on September 2014 affirmed another auditing standard 
requiring the communication of extra information in the Auditor's report; ISA 701 - 
communication of key audit matters in independent auditors report. ISA 700 - Forming an 
Opinion and reporting Financial Statements was likewise amended. The IAASB released these 
new and modified standards on 15 January 2015. On its part, the U.S. Open Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), amid a 13th August 2013 gathering proposed to 
upgrade the auditor’s report to incorporate critical audit matters (CAMs), an equivalent of 
KAMs. 
 
There are, however, different researchers’ findings that propose that in spite of unassuming 
enhancements to substance and organization of the auditor's report over time, it is still to a great 
extent perceived as giving minimal informational incentive to users (Church, Davis, 
&McCracken 2008). Carver et al., (2017) researched whether revelation of CAMs in the audit 
report as required by PCAOB would influence comprehensibility of audit report by both 
experienced and non-proficient investors. The outcomes uncovered that disclosure of CAMs 
contrarily influences lucidness of the audit report and limitedly affects the enlightening 
substance for investors. 
 
Overall, it was concluded that having KAMs in the audit reporting process is an important 
concept and that their introduction and applicability would have a positive effect ultimately. 
This resulted in introduction of KAMs in the enhanced audit report. KAMs are however, 
viewed as having both costs and benefits. Kachelmeier, Schmidt and Valentine (2017) contend 
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that whereas it’s meant to give users of the financial reports some signals of areas to concentrate 
on as well as making auditors more accountable for their work, it also has the limitation of 
making users “skewed” in reviewing the financial reports and only focusing on matters pointed 
out by the auditors.  
 
Moreover, Coram, Mock, Turner and Gray (2011) contend that communication of KAMs gives 
guidance to users to enable them explore complex financial reports and spotlight on issues 
featured by the auditor. Their study likewise shows that such featuring may skew clients' 
information procurement of other financial statements data, though having more issues in the 
auditor’s report mitigates the consideration dedicated to issues featured by the auditor and in 
this way influencing the quality of audit report. Additionally, users accessed more easily a thing 
referenced in the report and gave it more elevated consideration where there was just one issue 
reported in the report than when they were three or four. Subsequently, as needs be, auditors 
should be cautious in the choice of the KAMs and the number of matters to communicate in 
the auditor's report. 
 
This study intends to establish whether IAASB's proposal to include the new section in the 
audit report on KAMs, with the aim of improving audit communication was in line with users’ 
expectations (IAASB, 2014) and ultimately reduce expectations gap. The study will also be 
reviewing what determines the content of KAMs reported, drivers to these KAMs and format 
of reporting and this was reviewed in Kenyan context by looking at companies listed in Nairobi 
Securities Exchange. In addition, experimental studies on effects of extra disclosures in the 
audit report relating to an entity’s financials are uncertain in spite of some finding that there is 
no noteworthy effect on clients. There is also need to know whether the reporting process of 
KAMs has any influence on the auditors’ independence and if there is any risk or 
misinformation to users given the judgmental nature involved in arriving at KAMs to report. 
 
There are concerns that the changes on the audit report will only add complexity in nature and 
length but not value, to auditors reporting (Ghandar 2014). There are likewise second thoughts 
on whether the amendments genuinely comprehended what users needed and whether extra 
information will address their concerns (AUASB 2013). Moreover, there are likewise concerns 
that extra information and changes won't impact audit quality or improve the capacity of 
investors to decide (PwC2014), yet will increase the cost of reviews and auditors legal 




Within Kenya, in recent times the accountancy profession has come under public scrutiny with 
the media shining a spotlight on auditors in particular, highlighting financial accountability 
challenges in both public and private organizations. Of particular interest has been the 
perception that auditors have a fundamental role to play in stopping loss of funds through 
statutory auditors (Osodo, 2018). Auditors are not always necessarily innocent, but neither are 
they necessarily to blame (Osodo, 2018). So dire is the situation that it drew the attention of 
both the practitioners and academia. Mcfie 2017 , a leading accountant and academic, brought 
the matter to the fore highlighting that auditors have no magic wand to prevent fraud…”to put 
this perception matter in perspective, I believe it is important to appreciate what statutory audits 
are and what they are not. He continues to say, a statutory audit is not, as some would assume, 
a search for the proverbial needle in a haystack. Simply put a statutory audit is conducted to 
comply with set ‘statutes’ and to test financial statements for compliance with set ‘standards’”. 
The enhanced audit report is therefore a good place for any reader of financial statements to 
appreciate what an audit is and what the auditor does, and does not, do.  
 
1.1.1. Key Audit Matters 
KAMs is another prologue to auditing standards which is based on ISA 701 as issued out by 
the standards setting body, IAASB. ISA 701 focuses on the auditor’s responsibility to 
communicate KAMs in the audit report and is expected to address the auditors’ judgment with 
respect to what is report in the examiner's report, structure and substance of such 
correspondence. KAMs are chosen from issues previously communicated with those charged 
with governance, in our case being the Board Audit Committee (BAC). 
Users of financial reports have communicated enthusiasm for those issues about which the 
auditors had the most robust exchange with oversight team as a component of the two way 
correspondence required by ISA 260. Users have called for extra straightforwardness about 
those exchanges. For instance, users have communicated specific enthusiasm for understanding 
noteworthy judgements made by auditors in shaping conclusion and opinion on the financial 
statements all in all, since they are frequently identified with the areas of significant 
management discernment while preparing the financial statements. 
The ISA 701 applies to reviews of complete set of broadly useful financial reports of listed 
entities as well as in circumstances when the auditor generally chooses to convey KAMs in the 
audit report. This happens where it’s mandatory as per regulator for auditor to communicate 
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KAMs in audit report. Important to note however, ISA 705 prohibits auditors from conveying 
KAMs in instances where there is disclaimer of opinion on the financial statements except 
where revelation is legally necessary. 
In spite of communication of KAMs being judgemental, ISA 701 gives guidelines dependent 
on which the auditor can review issues previously communicated with BAC to decide what to 
incorporate in KAMs. The guidelines incorporate; territories of higher evaluated danger of 
material error, or noteworthy dangers distinguished as per ISA 315, significant auditor 
judgements relating to areas in the financial statements that involved significant management 
discernment, including accounting estimates that have been recognized as having high 
estimation vulnerability and matters with impact on the review of significant events or 
transactions but must have occurred during the period under audit. 
Communicating KAMs in the audit report is a follow up to the auditor having formed an 
opinion on the financial statements as a whole and is thus not by any means meant to 
substitute:(a) disclosures by management in the financial statements as per applicable financial 
reporting framework requirements, (b) for the auditor expressing a modified opinion as 
required by the circumstances of a specific audit engagement in accordance with ISA 705 (c) 
for reporting in accordance with ISA 570 when a material uncertainty exists relating to events 
or conditions that may cast significant uncertainty on an entity’s ability to continue as a going 
concern; or (d) a separate opinion on individual matters. 
Where there are no KAMs to report, it is the auditor to decide, that there are no KAMs to 
convey or that the main key review matters imparted are those issues tended to in the adverse 
opinion expressed by the auditor, by including an announcement to this effect. 
Taking everything into account, the motivation behind communicating KAMs in the expanded 
independent auditors report is to upgrade its informative nature by giving more noteworthy 
insights about the review that was performed. It gives extra transparency to planned users of 
the financial statements to help them understand those issues that, in the auditor's expert 
judgment, were most noteworthy in the review of the fiscal reports for period under review 
(Coram, Mock, Turner and Gray, 2011). The imparting may likewise aid users better 
understand the substance and areas of significant management judgment in the audited 
financial statements and thus reduce audit expectations gap. Hence need to restrain the 
utilization of profoundly specialized auditing terms in the KAMs to enable users with limited 
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audit knowledge to understand the basis for the auditor’s focus on particular matters during the 
audit and opinion thereof. 
In Kenya`s context, reported KAMs are as per the guidelines by ICPAK as borrowed from ISA 
701 and as well based on auditors’ judgment. The study therefore, seeks to understand the 
factors that auditors of listed companies put into consideration when making decision on what 
KAMs to report or not report in their audit report. Also, the study purposed to establish whether 
there is a format and order of presentation and whether there is a guideline on number of KAMs 
to include in any given audit report. 
1.2. Problem Statement 
Previously, the standardized one paragraph audit report, giving a pass or fail verdict was a 
source of discomfort to users of audited financial reports who felt information that could be 
important in guiding their decision making, even if not material to warrant change of opinion, 
was not being revealed (Chen & Tian, 2009). This resulted to the introduction of the enhanced 
audit report to include KAMs, but there is still a perceptual divergence of thoughts between 
auditors and users on content, drivers, nature, and number of KAMs reported as regards 
auditors’ bias given the judgemental nature involved in arriving at KAMs thus resulting to 
users’ misinformation. 
 
There is still a strain in the audit profession in this regard, and the discussion on remodelling 
of audit report incites blended responses (Bedard, Bera and Sirios, 2018). It is still an open 
inquiry on whether the expected result of KAMs has been accomplished, with certain 
researchers proposing that the data in audit reports is adequate (Simnett, &Huggins, 2014). 
Beneish, Billings, and Hodder (2008), contend there is need to give more data to build user 
appreciation and trust in the audited financial statements. Christensen et al. (2014) and Sirois 
et al. (2014) also give proof that KAMs paragraph enhances the informational value of the audit 
report. 
 
On the contrary, (Manoel and Quel, 2017) contest on the pertinence of these things in enhanced 
audit report saying they have no communicative value. Bedard et al. (2014) inspected financial 
market response to arrival of audit reports containing the justification of assessments (JOA) in 
France. Cade and Hodge (2014) demonstrate that in an environment where KAMs are publicly 





This being a relatively new compliance item in Kenya in conformity with the international 
standards of auditing, there are few or scarce studies done so far to highlight the nature and 
drivers of KAMs being reported by companies listed in NSE and impact of the additional 
disclosures across a wide range of users of the financial report. Previous researches on 
determinants of KAMs were mainly conducted in the more advanced western world. Recently, 
the Institute of Certified Public Accountants of Kenya (ICPAK) has put in place guidelines that 
require disclosure of KAMs, in compliance with ISA 701 (ICPAK, 2016). This paper sought 
to contribute to the scarce evidence on the determinants and nature of KAMs being reported in 
the Kenyan context and method of evaluation for disclosures. The researcher also sought to 
identify the impact of KAMs reported to users given the judgemental nature of KAMs, with no 
specific guidelines developed locally in this regard, thus leaving the moral burden with the 
auditor to ensure compliance to the letter and spirit of ISA 701. 
 
1.3. Research Objectives 
1.3.1. Main Objective 
The key objective of this research is to examine the determinants of key audit matters in the 
revised auditor’s report and its impact on the audit expectations gap. 
1.3.2. Specific Objective 
i. To examine the content of KAMs reported by auditors in the enhanced auditors’ report 
of companies listed in the NSE. 
ii. To investigate the drivers associated with reported KAMs by companies listed in the 
NSE. 
iii. To assess the nature and number KAMs reported in the enhanced audit reports of 
companies listed in the NSE. 
 
1.4. Research Questions 
i. What is the content of KAMs reported in the revised auditor’s report? 
ii. What determines content of KAMs for listed companies in NSE? 
iii. What is the nature and number of KAMs reported in the enhanced auditor’s reports of 




1.5. Scope of the study 
The study reviewed the addition of KAMs in the independent auditors’ report as per the IAASB 
framework, which was originally not captured in the audited financial reports of the sixty-five 
(65) listed companies in the NSE for the period between 2015 and 2017. These listed 
companies are among the early adopters of the requirement in Kenya. In the study, content of 
KAMs, drivers of arriving at the KAMs, nature and number of KAMs reported in the audit 
report was also reviewed in regards to the quality of audit and impact on users of financial 
reports. 
 
The research also reviewed the audited financial reports for the same listed companies for the 
period before and after the introduction of enhanced auditor’s report to establish whether there 
was any improvement in regards to reduction of audit expectations gap. This covered the period 
between 2015 and 2017. 
 
In comparing the enhanced audit report, for periods before and after the introduction of KAMS, 
the study based findings on the following independent elements of companies listed in NSE; 
Firm size, Subsidiaries, Auditors type, Cross listing status, Industry and Cross section of years. 
This was reviewed in an environment with the following control variables; corporate 
governance as aligned with CCGSI 2015; company profitability as measured by Return on 
Assets (ROA) and company performance in the security market measured through the company 
stock liquidity. 
 
1.6. Limitation of the Study 
Albeit earlier research of audit reports is broad, exploratory research so far carried out in 
regards to impact of the recently expanded audit reports, which rely on judgements and 
decisions of auditors in coming up with KAMs, is still scarce. Additionally, existing research 
has concentrated on inspecting the effect of the enhanced independent auditors report within 
the Western and European setting.  
 
1.7. Significance of the Study 
Investors, regulators, and academics are interested in the study on the expanded audit report 
and specifically the KAMs since it is the first time that auditors have had a “voice” in 




1.7.1. Firms’ Stakeholders 
Stakeholders of the firm who are also referred to as users of the financial reports will find 
relevance in the research since they will be well informed on value addition capability of the 
enhance independent auditors report for their decision making unlike previously when the 
report was standard with no insights to the companies on goings. Consequently, stakeholders 
will be in a position to engage and give feedback to firms, thus making auditors, management 
and board of directors more transparent and accountable on information they provide hence 
improving on the expectations gap. 
 
This issue is exacerbated for nonprofessional speculators, who in contrast with analysts, for the 
most part have poorly characterized decision models, have limited information about 
significance of specific financial statement items or the relations among financial statement 
thus failing to recognize explicit information required for related reviews (Lennox, Schmidt 
and Thompson 2018). Like less experienced analysts, nonprofessional investors will in general 
use hazy searches for information like reading financials in the order presented (Köhler and 
Theis, 2016). KAMs have thus come in to guarantee that users like investors and analysts, focus 
on key areas that, as per the auditors are significant for their decision making. 
 
1.7.2. Academia 
The study findings will add to existing literature and knowledge by scrutinizing determinants 
and drivers of KAMs as reported in the enhanced audit report and their impact in addressing 
audit quality and users expectations gap. There is little knowledge in this area more so in 
developing countries with most research being more global than local and the compliance 
requirements having been recently introduced and adopted through ISA 701. This study will 
be resourceful in advancing a different perspective by enlightening stakeholders on importance 
of reporting KAMs in enhanced audit report and possible areas of improvement. 
 
1.7.3. Regulators, standards and professional bodies 
The study also intended to guide the development of a national or international guideline of 
what should and what should not be included in the KAMs based on feedback from 
stakeholders.  There is also need to standardize the enhanced independent auditors’ report, 
especially the KAMs section to make it consistent in presentation and formulation to enable 
comparability more so by users who are reviewing various companies in diverse geographical 
regions. Moreover, there is a need to ensure that the enhanced report is protected from 
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management and board influence but formulated independently by the auditor in the course of 
his work. There should be a more detailed template to guide the auditors in deciding what and 
how the KAM items should look like. Currently, there is quite a huge leeway given to auditors’ 
judgment which is bound to change based on other factors like experience, expertise in the field 
of audit, time availed for the audit and also interactions with both management and the board 






















This chapter presents an evaluation of past literature relating to revised audit reporting, and the 
determinants of KAMs reported. The theoretical framework is provided, which explores the 
theories relating to the study. Also, an empirical review of previous studies conducted 
discussing nature of KAMs reported in the enhanced auditor’s report, determinant of the nature 
of KAMs and their form and order of presentation, all with the aim of minimizing audit 
expectations gap. This is then followed by presenting a conceptual framework which links the 
KAMs reported to independent variables that auditors consider when deciding KAMs to report. 
The section then concludes by providing the research gaps established what has been done in 
this area, what is the current situation and what is missing or needs to be done to ensure KAMs 
as presented help in reducing audit expectations gap.  
 
2.2. Theoretical Literature Review 
Various theories have been adopted to give clarity on the concepts, quality and impact of 
auditing of financial statements of an organization. The theoretical framework is anchored on 
three theories namely; theory of inspired confidence, signalling theory and agency theory.  
 
2.2.1. The Theory of Inspired Confidence 
This theory is also referred to as the theory of rational expectation. This principle was 
developed by Limperg (1920) and focuses on the demand and supply for audit services. In 
reference to scholars’ findings, the demand for audit services is as a first-hand result of having 
external stakeholders in the company (Hayes et al., 2005). These stakeholders’ also known as 
third parties demand for accountability from management in exchange for their investment in 
the company. It is assumed that information as presented by management might be biased due 
to possible conflicts of interests between management and the third parties thus the need to 
audit this information.  
 
Audit function is established in the confidence and trust that society puts in the viability of the 
audit review and opinion. If audit work is to accomplish its target, at that point no more 
certainty might be put in its fulfilment than is supported by work completed and by expertise 
13 
 
of the auditor, however, this role must be performed in a way that legitimizes the credence 
placed in its satisfaction. (Limperg, 2002) 
 
Various theories have come up to determine and specify the audit function. The theories and 
or principles explain and describe expectations of stakeholders on the auditor, including 
safeguarding against fraud, warning of future insolvency, re-assurance of financial stability and 
general understanding of the audit report. The expectations for the auditor are rather straight 
forward however there still exists a gap majorly as a result of diverse views held about the audit 
function. The mismatch is mainly from what public expectation of the auditor function is and 
what the auditor can and should do. 
 
Russell (1986), revealed that external auditors in the Anglo-American world were confronted 
with ‘a liability crisis and a credibility crisis’ and this is yet to subside two decades later, rather, 
they have been fuelled by well-publicised corporate fiascos, particularly those that happened 
around the turn of the 21st century, for example, Enron and WorldCom in the USA, Barings 
Bank, and Equitable Life in the United Kingdom, Parmalat in Italy, HIH in Australia and 
Satyam in India. 
Audit function plays an important role to the public interest, that of “strengthen accountability 
and reinforce trust and confidence in financial reporting” (ICAEW, 2005). The Anglo-
American scandals have however tainted the profession due to this negative publicity. As a 
result, global opinions demanding the improvement of audit quality were voiced leading to 
changes aimed at promoting greater transparency and accountability within the audit 
profession. The demand for continuous improvement still exist which raises the questions as 
to what extent the demands and concerns can be addressed to minimize audit expectations gap. 
It is noted that to answer this question, there is need for users to distinguish what auditing 
means, its purpose and the limitation and relationships within the audit role.  
When auditors do not meet their obligations and society expectations, it results to criticism and 
a loss of confidence in their work. That is the audit expectation – performance gap; this is a 
misalignment of society’s expectations of the auditors as compared to what it perceives they 
deliver. Previous research has noted three elements to this gap; ‘Reasonableness gap’ 
(unreasonably expectations of society on auditors performance) and performance gap – 
composed of a ‘deficient standards gap’ (responsibilities reasonably expected but not required 
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of auditors) and ‘deficient performance gap’ (existing responsibilities of auditors which society 
feels auditors do not perform well) 
 
Up until 1990s, auditing profession concentrated on lessening society's (specifically, financial 
statement users’) absurd expectations of auditors guided mainly by the recommendations of 
the Cohen (Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities, 1978). The profession tried to 
accomplish this objective by reforming the audit report into an educational tool. The Cohen 
Commission watched: 'the auditor's standard report is nearly the main formal method used to 
educate and advice users of financial statements on the role of the audit function. It in this 
manner suggested through SAS No. 58 the introduction of "long form" standard audit report 
which clarified individual duties of management and auditor on the financial statements. It 
incorporated concise description of review procedures and specified the level of affirmation 
given by the review feeling. 
 
Audit function is necessary for validating the accuracy and correctness of the information 
provided by companies. The auditor acts as the go between management and users of the 
financial information and helps reduce information asymmetry, by communicating with those 
using the information provided. It is thus necessary for the relevant group to have clarity of the 
auditors’ role. However there are several conflicting opinions regarding the introductions of 
KAMs in reducing the expectations gap. Humphrey (1997) gives the most prominent 
distinctions between perspectives on auditing: as a socially oriented function, where "the 
auditors are depicted as moral, socially dependable people," and auditing as a monopolistic 
business. This theory is relevant to the study as it focuses on understanding components within 
the expectation gaps and possibilities of eliminating these components by understanding and 
defining what KAMS are reported and their adequacy.  
 
2.2.2. Signaling Theory 
Signaling theory, which was first developed by Michael Spence, has transcendently been 
applied in corporate finance (Shehata, 2014), marketing (Sharma Davcik and Pillai, 2016) just 
as in other different fields of study. Signaling theory is helpful for portraying the conduct when 
two parties (people or associations) are accessible to distinctive information. Regularly, one 
party, the sender, must look on ways on how to impart (or signal) that information, and 
receiving party, who is the beneficiary, decides how to translate the signal. As needs be, 
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signaling theory holds a conspicuous position in an assortment of executives writing, including 
strategic management, entrepreneurship, and human resource management.  
 
IAASB and PCAOB proposed a method named “signaling effect” to defeat the issue of 
information overload for users of the financial information. This fills in as a psychological 
inclination that modifies the presentation of information and predispositions the manner in 
which information is perceived and processed (Lennox and Pittman, 2011). ). Information 
overload can be minimized by giving prompts on the most proficient method to utilize the 
accessible information. Tian and Chen (2009) propose that individuals adapt better where 
prompts are included that feature the association of the essential material. This predisposition 
can be presented in a few different ways, for example, featuring or underlining writings or 
drawing tables. 
 
As much as signalling aides reduce the time spent choosing and sorting out important issues, it 
also makes accessibility of valuable information in the audit report faster by guiding users to 
sections of the financial statements that are alluded to in the audit report (Lennox and Pittman, 
2016). All things considered, it is expected that users will get to the parts of the financial 
statements that are alluded to in the auditor's report quicker and give higher consideration to 
these parts. On the other side, the signal inclines the user’s information procurement behaviour 
towards things featured in KAMs of audit report. 
 
In an experimental study conducted in North American on impact of KAM disclosure (or 
CAMs, the term used by the PCAOB), Christensen et al., (2014) observed some 
nonprofessional investors who are business school graduates, who invest in individual stocks 
and follow closely company financial information. The study examined how these subjects 
respond to an audit report's CAMs paragraph that is focused on the review of fair value 
estimates and found that speculators are in reality bound to quit thinking about the company as 
an investment venture. The outcome speaks to an information impact. Kachelmeier et al. (2014) 
also structured a study to test the impact of disclosing CAMs in the US. Their subjects were 
however MBA understudies, and the authors demonstrate that such a revelation as above brings 
down users perception of audit assurance and responsibility. 
 
Previous studies that analysed management reports as prepared by management, confirmed the 
complexity involved in communicating financial statement (Lewis, Parker, Pound, and 
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Sutcliffe, 1986), footnote disclosure (Griffin, 2014), corporate annual report (Rahman, 2012; 
Dainelli, Bin & Giunta, 2013) and analyst reports (Zhou, Wang,  Zhang & An, 2018) hence 
need for guidance in their review. The theory is therefore relevant to the study since it 
emphasizes on need to have KAMs in the expanded audit report that serves to guide the users 
in narrowing down on their review of the financial reports to key matters, while also outlining 
the risk of KAMs giving users a skewed view of the overall reports. The theory also helps in 
bridging expectations’ gap by signaling users to show them areas reviewed during the audit 
hence ensuring auditor and user are on the same page. 
 
2.2.3. The Agency Theory 
The ‘agency-theory’ brought about by Stephen Ross and Barry Mitnick is viewed in light of 
the clashing interests of investors and the executives of an organization, recommending that 
the less-informed parties, the shareholders, will have an interest for information that screens 
conduct and activities of the  more informed manager. In the agency theory, (Watts and 
Zimmerman) a reputable auditor - an auditor who is seen to meet users expectations - is selected 
in light of a legitimate concern for third parties as well as in light of a legitimate concern for 
the executives. Along these lines, review of financial reports serves as one type of such 
information, furnishing shareholders with reliable affirmation of progress in the organization. 
 
The theory applies where agency relationship (‘principal-agent’) appears when principal 
delegates work to an  agent who performs the work with the objective of firm’s shareholder 
wealth maximization but checked through separation of the management and control 
(Ferguson, Green, Vaswani, and Wu, 2013). Mitnick,(2015) clarifies that the ability of 
shareholders to successful apply control over management is decimated by such factors as, the 
inability of shareholders to on a day to day basis observed and remedy undesirable practices 
by management. Along these lines, there is plausibility of the executives seeking after targets 
more to its greatest advantage than in light of a legitimate concern for investors – ‘agency 
losses’. Consequently, as a result of the mismatch in the principal-agent relationship, this 
necessitates what is called 'agency costs.' Principals will always endeavour to screen the 
conduct of managers to discourage such self-seeking practices by management by establishing 
controlling components such as contracts; intended to align the interests of agents to those of 




Managers, acting naturally intrigued, look for approaches to raise their pay over their marginal 
productivity to the firm. Various devices exist to control the organization costs of self-intrigued 
administrators; chiefly, the board of directors, auditors,, stock-based remuneration plans, 
rivalries in the product markets, and rivalry from different managers inside and without the 
firm. Be that as it may, every one of these devices are exorbitant and consequently, are 
constrained in their capacity to control managerial self-dealing. 
 
The fundamental role of statutory audits is to lessen agency costs by guaranteeing that the 
management is acting to the best interest of users of financial reports Be that as it may, there 
are additionally information asymmetries between the principals who are the recipients of audit 
reports and the auditors, this is, auditor has progressively, better and prior information on the 
performance of audit and its outcomes than recipient (Wiseman, Cuevas‐ Rodríguez, and 
Gomez‐ Mejia, 2012). The auditor can minimise such asymmetries by giving extra information 
and disclosures to the principal (i.e., the addressees of the audit) and the revised audit report is 
a potential methods through which more information can be availed to the principal (Wiseman 
et al., 2012). 
 
Davis, Schoorman, and Donaldson (1997) submitted that the divergent interests in an 
organization could be aligned through proper monitoring which results in monitoring costs and 
a well-planned compensation system which results to bonding costs. The monitoring and 
bonding could, however, end up being ineffective if the board oversight is absent. 
 
The independent auditors’ report, which ideally is an agency cost, was previously viewed to be 
very economical with information to the stakeholders, regarding operations of the company 
whereby it was just limited to giving a pass/fail opinion (Soltani, 2007). The introduction of 
KAMs in the audit report, however, gives stakeholders more insights of the company and thus 
the assurance that the management is not only running the organization for self-interest but is 
also checking on the shareholder's wealth maximization. Therefore, the theory is relevant to 
this study since it emphasizes on importance of understanding the agency relationship and its 
implications in bridging the expectation gap between the principal (users or shareholders) and 
agent (management) by giving relevant KAMs that would guide users in better understanding 




2.3. Empirical Literature Review 
With reference to the study objectives, this section reviews existing literature on revised 
independent auditors report in light of the nature of KAMs being reported, what drives the 
KAMs to be reported and the nature and number in which the KAMs are reported. Research 
conducted in this area has shown various inconsistencies which may be explained by 
differences in theories used, the judgmental nature of audit, auditors experience, conflicting 
role of auditors, lag in responding to changes in regulations, self-regulation nature of auditing 
profession, variables used and methodology (Lee and Ali, 2008). Hence, this section highlights 
the various inconsistencies presented in empirical findings. 
 
2.3.1. Content of KAMs reported in the enhanced audit report of companies listed in 
NSE 
The idea of auditor disclosure of KAMs isn't totally new given it has been operational in  
France, since 2003, where auditors are supposed to make commentaries referred to as 
“Justification of Assessments” (JOA), in their report (Pinto and Morais 2018). JOA are 
fundamentally the same as KAMs since they are aimed at "empower users of the report to better 
comprehend work done and explanations for the statutory auditors’ opinion on the financial 
statements ". With respect to KAMs that are reported in a separate section, immediately after 
the audit opinion and where necessary, allude to the important financial statements and 
disclosures, which identify with unveiled issue. 
 
In Kenya, communication of KAMs in the audit report was formally adopted by Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants of Kenya (ICPAK) in April 2015 and rendered effective for 
periods ending on or after December 2016 in compliance with ISA 701. Adoption of KAMs 
was made mandatory for all listed companies in Kenya as stipulated by the Capital Markets 
Authority guidelines of November 2016, with an option for voluntary application for entities 
other than listed companies. Subsequently, other regulators ensured adoption of KAMs as 
follows; all deposit-taking Sacco’s as per the Sacco Societies Regulatory Authority (SASRA) 
guideline dated November 2016 and all insurance regulated entities as per the Insurance 
Regulatory Authority (IRA) guideline of August 2016. 
 
The auditor decides the substance of KAMs to report based on issues previously discussed with 
board audit committee, and must require significant auditor attention due to unpredictability 
and judgment required in performing the review. In making this decision, the auditor shall 
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consider such aspects as: (a) areas of higher assessed risk of material misstatement or 
significant risks identified in accordance with ISA 315; (b) significant auditor judgments 
relating to areas in the financial statements that involved significant management judgment, 
including accounting, estimates that have been identified as having high estimation 
vulnerability; and (c) their effect must be on the audit of significant events or transactions that 
occurred during the period under review.  
 
KAMs communication is a follow up to an auditor having formed an opinion on the financial 
statements as a whole. However, it should be clarified that communicating KAMs in the 
auditor’s report is not:(a) A substitute for disclaimer of opinion or adverse opinion; (b) A 
substitute for the auditor expressing a modified opinion when required by the circumstances 
asper ISA 705; (c) A substitute for reporting material uncertainty existence as per ISA 570, that 
cast significant doubt to an entity’s going concern; or (d) a separate opinion on individual 
matters. (ISA 701) 
 
While the absence of qualified opinion is adequate for most users of financial reports, research 
demonstrates that users are ending up increasingly more keen on getting greater substance 
explicit data far beyond the institutionalized audit report issued by the independent auditor 
(Ishak and Nor, 2018). They believe such information would help them to survey the financial 
condition and performance of the entity as well as evaluate the quality of the audit. PWC (2015) 
feedback on the new and revised audit reporting standards advanced some value-adding 
insights where they indicated, the hugest development in the new standards, without a doubt, 
is the presentation of KAMs as per ISA 701. This section on KAMs reveals insight into those 
issues in the period under review that, in the auditor's judgment, were of most significance.  
 
Giving progressively explicit information on an organization review in the audit report may 
pass on added value or important insights to users. Hatherly, Brown, and Innes (1998) without 
a doubt propose that more disclosure on significant issues may influence the users' impression 
of the audit. They analysed impact of a freestyle review report, which, notwithstanding the 
standard report, incorporated a four pages freestyle report of key matters experienced 
throughout the review, alongside with their resolutions. In addition to other things, they 
discovered that the freestyle report altogether expanded users' recognition of audit report and 




Nonetheless, financial disclosure overload and the multifaceted nature of revised audit report 
has been tended to by numerous associations and researchers over the years (Radin, 2007; 
Kirkpatrick, 2009). The volume of disclosures is viewed as the hugest supporter of this issue. 
This is because, in regards to decision making, users are limited level-headed due to their 
constrained cognitive capacities to process and assimilate all data presented to them (Klueber, 
Gold and Pott, 2018).  
 
At the point when information supply surpasses the individual’s capacity to process it, an 
individual experiences issues in recognizing the pertinent information. All things considered, 
users may have challenges deciding where to start in reviewing the financials and disclosures 
presented due to the volumes and may end up concentrating on immaterial information and 
missing out on pertinent information (IAB publication, 2011). Undoubtedly, users may decide 
to react to information overload by either withdrawal, i.e., downplaying the quantity of data, 
or filtering, i.e., processing just information distinguished as having high need. To adapt to 
their constrained subjective capacity, users maintain a strategic distance from intemperate data 
supply by keeping information to a minimum. 
 
The incorporation of extra information in form of KAMs may likewise influence users' view 
of the audit, to be specific their impression of audit quality by and large just as the consistency 
and similarity of assurance level among financial statements components. Bédard et al. (2014) 
uncovered that disclosure of such information has even more an emblematic than informative 
value. The flipside of introduction of KAMs has been seen in financial markets not responding 
to them as well as increase in audit cost and efficiency. Earlier studies on the expanded audit 
review report essentially centre on the presence and not the substance of the expanded audit 
report (Kachelmeier, 2017; Lennox et al., 2018). 
 
Other researchers, however, have faulted KAMs introduction claiming it could result in extra 
review costs due to expanded review endeavours in the form of added procedures to react to 
higher obligation and notoriety dangers related with KAMs. They may also create additional 
quality control processes and increased consultations at the most senior level of engagement 
team with senior management and audit committee (IAASB, 2012). KAM may likewise 
influence the productivity of the review, subsequently causing more review slack. Truth be 
told, the "effort required to decide, get ready language for correspondence, and archive KAMs 




Besides, the assembly of KAM language to box-ticking consistency and a bull market in 
boilerplate are a conviction, to the debasement of significant worth to users. That is basically 
on the grounds that organization similitudes crosswise over areas and enterprises are far more 
noteworthy than individual contrasts between them, so the presentation of KAMs will develop 
to institutionalized terms. Looking at the various industries, almost all banks have issues with 
portfolio of non-performing credits while investors in exotic financial derivatives have issues 
with valuation. Revenue recognition is a major cause of concern in the technology sector since 
IBM designed the gaming techniques during the 1950s (Bini, Dainella and Giunta, 2013). It 
might therefore be safe to anticipate that — as a methods for fighting off the PCAOB's ticket-
counting examination process — each Big Four review in the United States will in all respects 
rapidly be found to have some base number of KAMs while defensive reporting will win. 
 
A post-implementation survey of KAMs by UK Financial Reporting Council (FRC) among 
150 auditors' reports in the UK demonstrated that the prominent five most report KAMs in the 
UK incorporate; Impairment of both assets and goodwill, Tax matters, the board abrogate of 
controls and misrepresentation in revenue recognition. In any case, what to incorporate into a 
specific audit report depends exclusively on auditors' expert judgment. 
 
Likewise, discourse on the substance of KAMs with management and board audit committee 
before finalizing the auditor’s report may also cause delay in issuance of audit report. In reality, 
IAASB (2012) demonstrates that the more iterative procedure before completion of audit may 
influence timing of the release of audited annual reports. Cade and Hodge (2014) with alumni 
of a noteworthy US university as participants disseminated the impact on managers' 
correspondence transparency after expanding the audit report. Their outcomes uncover that 
additional disclosure on accounting estimate subtleties in the audit report diminishes 
management`s eagerness to impart private information to their auditors. This accordingly 
results in counter-productive outcomes as opposed to the expected value addition. 
 
Scholars’ who have researched on the content of audit reports for the most part demonstrates 
that the data substance of the previous audit reports was low, and henceforth, the expectations 
gap. Church and Shefchik (2011) concluded that the audit report was fundamentally 
emblematic than informative. This may even be the situation with the expanded report when 
the reviewers issue going-concern assessment or mention basis of their audit scoping to arrive 
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at an opinion since investors for all time keep reconsidering and changing their expectations 
and don't sit tight waiting for the auditor’s report (Simnett and Huggins, 2014). In this specific 
case, the response of the financial market is not reliant upon substance and nature of audit 
report, regardless of whether the report is increasingly itemized. This is all the more so the 
situation where expanded audit report is excessively standardized (“boilerplate”), or too 
complex and mind boggling in terms of readability, or too heavy to digest due to cognitive 
overload. Criticism by review firms, from polls sent to them, PWC demonstrate that they 
bolster the new segment in the evaluator's report, yet their in-house reviews through discussions 
with clients revealed that it is viewed as standard with no increased transparency. E&Y 
additionally focused on this perspective while proposing that clients may find it difficult to 
comprehend the utilization of particular terminologies in this segment which users probably 
won't be acquainted with therefore expanding instead of reducing users expectations gap. 
 
In summary, KAMs have attention directing impact on the financials report (Bedard & Bera, 
2018). However, the content of KAMs reported is purely based on the auditors’ judgment after 
discussion with management and board audit committee. It is thus prone to bias due to human 
element involved which could include lack of adequate audit expertise, limited understanding 
and knowledge of the business auditing, personal relationship with the auditee, all which could 
impact on quality and independence of audit and ultimately content of KAMs reported. This is 
a likely case in Kenya where auditor rotation for listed companies is recommended but not 
made mandatory and there is no regulatory enforcement behind it. 
 
2.3.2. Drivers associated with the content of KAMs reported by companies listed in the 
NSE 
Generally, the guidelines by IAASB on how to arrive at KAMs are usually; must come from 
among all matters already communicated with board audit committee; the auditor must have 
narrowed down on matters requiring special auditor attention in the course of auditing; then 
rank the matters in order of significance, based on his judgment, from the most significant to 
the least before finally including them in the auditor’s report, having reviewed and gotten 
permission where necessary to curve out sensitive matters, from management.  
 
Specifically, ISA 701 gives guideline of what ought to be included in the KAMs as;(a) areas 
of  identified high risks as per ISA 315 or involving significant auditor judgment;( b) areas 
where auditor encountered significant challenges auditing, including with respect to obtaining 
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sufficient appropriate audit evidence ( c) circumstances that required significant modification 
of the auditor’s planned approach to the audit, including as a result of the identification of a 
significant deficiency in internal control (d) should be limited to those matters of most 
significance in the current period audit. 
 
There are instances, when things resolved to be KAMs are not conveyed in the report. If the 
law or regulations preclude public revelation of some issue; or in very rare circumstances, the 
auditor establishes that the matter ought not to be conveyed in the report in light of the fact that 
the antagonistic results of doing that would logically be expected to exceed the public intrigue 
advantages of such correspondence. This discussion will however not have any significant 
bearing where the entity has already publicised information on key audit matter at hand. ISA 
220 encourages engagement partner to always undertake wide and appropriate consultation on 
any matter he/she finds contentious or troublesome. 
 
In previous periods, the European Parliament brought on board audit reforms related 
legislations like the Regulation No. 537/2014 and Directive No 2014/56/EU on statutory audits. 
Whereas these regulations do not refer to the new changes introduced by IAASB, it is believed 
that the input by the EU as well as other jurisdiction regulatory bodies is welcome in future in 
driving the audit reforms. Legislative jurisdictions governing audit reports are very diverse, 
from those governed by IAASB that issue the International Standards of Auditing Standards 
(ISA), to those governed by Audit Standards Board (ASB) and PCAOB of America that issue 
the Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS), to those governed by Audit and 
Assurance Standards Board (AUASB) of Australia that issues Australian Auditing Standards 
(AAS), all aiming at giving clarity and disclosure in the audit report on the applicable 
guidelines in coming up with the report and probably address specific geographical and cultural 
related expectation gaps. 
 
IAASB in its invitation to comment, recommended that communication of KAMs in the audit 
report may as well widen expectations gap should users see them as giving explicit 
confirmation on individual records or disclosures alluded to in the audit report (IAASB, 2012). 
Because of these worries, the IAASB proposition does not expect auditors to incorporate 
review techniques performed in their communication of KAM (IAASB 2013), rather simply 
required to make reference to the premise of review checklist, assessment and opinion in 




Whereas financial statement users may request more prominent substance and engagement 
explicit disclosures in the audit report, the advantages of such revelation remain questionable 
and any such unproven advantage would need to be reviewed hand in hand with non-trivial 
difficulties and issues encountered as a result of increased disclosure. Among such issues is the 
danger of incorporating an excessive number of issues in the audit report which may diminish 
the overall adequacy of the auditor's correspondence on the issues (Hardies, Hossain and 
Chapple, 2016). Users may likewise improperly substitute in-depth review of financial reports 
with highlights as shown on auditor’s disclosures thus missing out on valuable information in 
the financial statements that was note alluded to in the KAMs (IAASB). Thus, the objective of 
standard setters objective of "improve users' capacity to settle on informed decisions on the 
premise regarding the audited financial report might be undermined. 
 
Statutory audits, which are a requirement for all listed companies in Kenya, other than giving 
an opinion, additionally mirror every jurisdictions orders and usually have constrained 
objectives that are often identified with jurisdictional tax assessment. Amid casual discourses 
of statutory audit impacts with fellow IAASB members, the accompanying articulation is 
frequently heard "You should be able to distinguish statutory reviews from financial statement 
audits for public companies." This is to imply that other than complying with the international 
audit standards, they are additionally bound by the legislative requirements of the particular 
jurisdiction. By clarifying jurisdiction and legislative requirements auditor is working within, 
in the enhanced audit improved review report, deficient standards gap (users expectation of 
auditors but not a requirement) is reasonably addressed to the users 
 
At long last, it was found that contrary to expectations by standards setters’, correspondence 
of additional matters, in the form of KAMs in the audit report does not necessarily build the 
apparent dimension of improved audit quality, but rather even lowered users’ perception of 
quality as per results of a study in one of the settings tried. This is because the driver of KAMs 
reported which are the international standards and legislations developed for various 
jurisdictions are general in nature hence giving leeway to auditors’ judgement and justification 
of inclusion or omission of KAMs in the report (Daske,Hail, Leus & Verdi, 2011). 
  
Additionally, where audit report contains KAMs, users tend to feel that level of affirmation 
given by the auditor may vary crosswise over components of the financial statements. By and 
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large, these outcomes demonstrate that while the communication of additional information may 
have attention directing value, it might equally have negative impacts thus increasing the 
expectation gap. This necessitated this study to hence identify the genuine drivers for KAMs 
reported beyond the standard setters’ guidelines. 
 
2.3.3. Nature and number of KAMs reported in enhanced audit reports of companies 
listed in NSE 
The continuous attacks on the over the decades has necessitated critical reforms within the 
profession (Pourheydari and Abousaiedi, 2011). Financial crisis and scandals of the last decade 
acted as trigger whereby EU launched a broad discourse process among member countries in 
regards to audit reforms. The reforms were targeted at issues relating to purpose of financial 
audit, independence of auditors and transparency of information provided in the audit report as 
well as audit compliance with transparency principle, in the line with corporate governance. 
To expand transparency within the auditors work and consequently reduce expectation gap, 
there were such new proposition like revision of the audit report, so as to build the dimension 
of disclosure provided by the auditors. IAASB was involved, in a procedure of elucidation of 
auditing standards, concentrating on audit reporting and audit quality.  
 
To demonstrate transparency in audit procedure and improve the communicative value of audit, 
it was made a requirement to communicate KAMs in the audit report per ISA 701. The 
regulation likewise illuminates the judgmental nature in arriving at what to report in the audit 
report, structure and substance of such reports. KAMs are chosen from issues already 
communicated with board audit committee (ISA 701, para. 8). There is however no rule with 
respect to how to exhibit the KAMs and what number of KAMs ought to be in a given review 
report. Paragraph 10 of the regulations considers the auditor competent enough to figuring out 
which of the issues raised were more significant than the others from the audit of the period 
under review. In spite of the fact that changes introduced provide additional information, none 
of the changes add more responsibilities to the auditor than they previously had. 
 
Going by this criteria of deciding on what qualifies to be KAM and also guided by other factors 
such as complexity and size of the entity, type of client business and environment it operates 
in, facts and circumstances under which the audit engagement was entered, the auditor might 
end up with very many or very few KAMs (Cordoş & Fülöp, 2015). ISA 701 however does not 
give guidance on number of KAMs are adequate in an audit report and hence leaves the 
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decision to the auditor’s professional judgement. Generally, the more the number of matters 
considered to be KAMs, the less useful the auditor’s communication may be, hence more 
reason why auditor need to reconsider whether each of the matters meets the definition of a 
key audit matter in regards to significance. 
 
Whereas the PCAOB has been quiet with regards to the effect of the quantity of KAMs reported 
in the audit report, IAASB (2012) determines that "as a rule, the more the number of KAMs, 
the less helpful the audit communication of KAMs might be." This recommends that by giving 
multiple signals, you may make disarray and be less compelling in lessening the information 
overload than when just a couple of things are conveyed, consequently the danger of 
incorporating an excessive number of issues in the audit report and hence diminishing overall 
effectiveness of the auditor’s communication on KAMs (IAASB 2013). 
 
A laboratory experiment that employed unobtrusive eye-tracking technology was conducted 
using post-graduate accounting whereby participants assumed the job of junior financial 
analysts and analysed the financial statements of a manufacturing company. The financial 
reports of the manufacturing company introduced one of four variations of the reviewer's 
report: original pass/fail audit report, audit report with one or two KAMs, and lastly report with 
three KAMs presented alongside related audit procedures. This between-subjects configuration 
permits assessing user behaviour variation with (1) the present audit report and a report with 
additional KAMs reported, (2) the quantity of KAMs presented in the auditor’s report, and (3) 
the inclusion of audit procedure in the discussion of the KAMs. 
 
Results from the experiment demonstrate that participants were very keen with supplementary 
information introduced in the auditor's reports and that the issues referenced in the report 
influence the participants’ information acquisition. The number of KAMs referenced in the 
report (one versus three) additionally affects their information acquisition (Simnett and 
Huggins, 2014). In particular, users got to all the more quickly a thing referenced in the review 
report and gave it a larger amount of consideration when just one issue is imparted in the review 
report than when three issues were conveyed. This findings therefore show that such 
spotlighting of matters may bias the users’ information acquisition and that having more issues 
in the report reduces consideration dedicated to issues featured by the auditor. Therefore, 
auditors should be cautious in determination of the nature and number of KAMs to convey in 




This finding has direct policy implications from a standard setter perspective since it tends to 
answer questions raised by both the IAASB and PCAOB in regards to proposed changes in the 
audit reporting model. For instance, while expanded audit report disclosures affects the manner 
in which users navigate complex financial statements, IAASB and PCAOB should address the 
likelihood that the proposed model may really magnify expectations gap the proposed changes 
looks, to some degree, to address (Gunny and Zhang, 2013). Regulators ought to likewise 
explore further the finding proposing that users are less mindful to other information contained 
in the financial reports when multiple issues are disclosed by the auditor as it may infer that 
significant information is not incorporated by readers. 
 
The real exposure on the auditors with introduction of KAMs, even in the Kenyan setting is 
the issue of liability. The Chamber omits the genuine presentation, which is that investor 
offended parties' attorneys will salivate over the narrative record to be made under the 
PCAOB's assessment procedure, and the four-layered mischief to be exacted by its deficiency-
seeking process (Shaikh and Talha, 2003). In cases where the engagement partner is grilled in 
the lawsuits after the stock-price busts, antagonistic attorney will have a cross examination 
menu to browse through, that is the KAMs report: Squirming in the witness seat will be 
equalled just by unease in the jury box and a dire call for settlement financing. To counter this, 
each audit firm will in all respects rapidly be found to have some base number of KAMs 
reported while defensive reporting will prevail. This will eventually be counter-productive to 
the original expectation of KAMs. 
 
2.4. Conceptual Framework 
Conceptual framework of this study explains the relationship between the independent, and 
dependent variables. The relationship developed provides basis for research design and data 
analysis. In this study, figure 2.1 illustrates the dependent variables which are KAMs as 
reported, independent variables will are factors considered by auditor when coming up with 
KAMs including Firm Size, existence of subsidiaries within the group company, Auditor Type, 
Cross listing status, Industry and Cross section of years under review. The control variables are 
firm corporate governance alignment to CCGSI 2015, firm profitability and company stock 





Figure 2.1: Conceptual Framework 







Source: Author (2018) 
 
2.4.1. Company Size 
The size of the firm was added to the research as an independent variable and is to be measured 
as the total assets of the company in that year in consistency with previous research (Lakhal et 
al., 2014; Anderson& Frisk, 2016; Li, 2017). Various potential reasons have been advanced by 
scholars in support of an a priori expectation that the level of disclosure is positively associated 
with the size of the company. The bigger the size of a company, the higher the probability of 
reporting KAMs due to complexity of operations and depth of management involvement in 
operations than shareholders lack proper understanding of. 
 
2.4.2. Subsidiaries 
Subsidiaries in a company were included in the study as independent variables and were 
measured depending on whether the company is a multinational with a network of subsidiary 
companies across jurisdictions or is a domestic entity. Organizations with subsidiaries across 
various jurisdictions are bound to have more disclosures due to complexity of accounting, audit 
and reporting requirements across the jurisdictions (Tabachnick, Fidell, Ullman, (2007). There 
are also additional disclosures as a result of the complex nature of operations at the 
consolidation level which might require auditor’s judgement ability to report the same to the 
users without using complex and hard to understand accounting terms. Majority of listed 
companies at NSE had subsidiaries. 
 
Key Audit Matters 
 Content and drivers of 
KAMs 
 Nature and Number of 
KAMs 
 Company Size 
 Subsidiaries 
 Auditors Type 
 Cross listing Status 
 Industry 
 Trend Review over Year 
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2.4.3. Auditors Type 
The auditors type was added to the research as an independent variable and was reviewed in 
terms of either the audit of the company was conducted by a big four or non-big four. Though 
there is no proven research to show that big four audit firms are better than non-big four, the 
research intends to find out whether there was any relationship in reporting going by nature, 
format and number of KAMs reported by big four organizations as compared to the non-big 
four (Turner et al., 2010). For the period under review, listed companies were audited by a total 
of eleven audit firms, the big four, taking the majority at 56 companies, while seven small and 
medium audit firms audited the remaining 9 listed companies.  
 
2.4.4. Cross listing Status 
Cross listing status was taken as an independent variable in the regression. To illustrate, the 
extent of disclosure is generally greater for cross listed as opposed to firms listed in one 
jurisdiction or even for unlisted firms, with the differences in disclosure relating to the required 
information subset and disclosures, specific to each jurisdiction in which the firm is listed 
Zhou, Wang, Zhang and An (2018). In the Nairobi stock exchange there were nine firms cross 
listed across Uganda Securities Exchange (USE), Rwanda Stock Exchange (RSE) and Dar es 
Salaam Stock Exchange (DSE) in the period under study of 2015 to 2017. Since then there has 
however been an addition of one more company, the Bank of Kigali, as well as suspension of 
Uchumi supermarkets from trading despite being cross listed. 
 
2.4.5. Industry 
The industry in which a listed company belongs was taken as an independent variable in the 
conceptual framework. Research conducted by the Financial Analysts Federation's Corporate 
Information Committee indicates that extent of disclosure in annual reports may vary by 
industry. Furthermore, Sprouse (2002) has stated that it is quite possible that accounting 
policies, techniques, and (by implication) the extent and nature of disclosure vary by industry. 
If the extent of disclosure is industry related, it would confound the interpretation of the 
differential disclosure scores. Companies listed in the NSE are classified into eleven industries, 
these are, Agricultural, Automobile & Accessories, Banking, Commercial & Services, 
Construction & Allied, Energy & Petroleum, Insurance, Investment, Investment services, 




2.4.6. Trend Review over Years 
The cross section of years under study, 2015 to 2017, was taken as an independent variable for 
review. This period was chosen because it reflects period just prior to implementation of 
KAMs, period when KAMs was implemented in Kenya and period immediately after 
implementation. This is meant to help in comparison of audit report prior, immediate and after 
introduction of KAMs and impact on audit quality and addressing audit expectations gap. 
 
2.5. Operationalization of Key Variables 
Operationalization facilitates the reduction of the abstract notion of constructs into observable 
characteristics so that they can be measured using indicators. A scale ranging from 1=strongly 
disagree to 5=strongly agree will be used to measure both the dependent and independent 
variables. The indicators that were used in the studies are summarized in the below table. 
 
Table 2.51: Operationalization of Variables 









How the auditor 
determined those 
matters that, in his 
judgment, were of 
most significance 
and ought to be 
included in KAMs 
A Likert scale of 




agree, 4-agree & 
5-strongly agree. 
 







How many KAMs 
to include in the 
report and in what 
order are they 
presented for 
effectiveness 
A Likert scale of 










Company Size Does KAMs 
reported depend on 
the size of the 
organization? 
A Likert scale of 









agree, 4-agree & 
5-strongly agree 
Subsidiaries Do companies with 
subsidiaries report 
more KAMs than 
those without? 
A Likert scale of 









Auditors Type Does use of big 
four or other audit 
firms have an 
impact on type of 
KAMs reported 
A Likert scale of 




agree, 4-agree & 
5-strongly agree 




Does the nature of 
KAMs reported 
change where 
company is cross 
listed. 
A Likert scale of 




agree, 4-agree & 
5-strongly agree 
Zhou et al., 
(2018). 
Industry Are there 
similarities of 
KAMs for 
companies in same 
industry? 
A Likert scale of 




agree, 4-agree & 
5-strongly agree 







Have nature of 
KAMs reported 
changed over the 
years since 
introduction? 
A Likert scale of 














Source; Author (2019) 
 
2.6. Research Gap 
Expansion of the independent auditors report to include KAMs disclosure by auditors around 
the world was envisioned by the IAASB as a means to further improve the informative value 
of auditors’ reports. From one viewpoint, the financial market does not respond fundamentally 
to these JOA. Hence, past research affirm the possibility that the disclosure of additional 
information by the auditors preferably has an emblematic incentive over an informative value 
 
Moreover, study by Coram, Mock, Turner and Gray (2009) found that regardless of the form 
of audit report, whether long-form or short-form, users have little enthusiasm for the real 
substance of the audit report, past confirming if it is an unqualified audit report. Along these 
lines, enhancing the wording in the report does little to close the communication and 
expectation gap. 
 
The main research question being examined in this study is what determines the KAMs 
reported in the auditor’s report. This is due to nature of judgemental element involved in 
arriving at the KAMs to report and also due to lack of specific guidelines on the nature and 
content of KAMs to report, how to report them and number of KAMs to report to avoid 
information overload. Prior research on the determinants of KAMs reported has provided 
somewhat mixed results. There is no evidence yet on what exactly guides the auditors’ 
judgement rather than the generalist guidelines as per ISA 701 which could be influenced by 
other factors like the industry, auditor’s expertise and knowledge of the business, company 
performance and corporate governance (Turner, 2010; Gray et al., 2011). In reality, there are 
concerns about the value addition aspect of these communications. Over time, they may move 
toward becoming standard as a result of potential liability concerns thus results in auditors 
reporting about as few issues as could reasonably be expected or giving an extensive rundown 
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of repetitive exposures which may not be effectively justifiable as a result of the use of technical 
language that may result in excessive other reporting, along these lines making the examiner's 
report to be ambiguous (IFAC, 2012), and extra costs with questionable benefits. 
 
Therefore the research on this area is not conclusive and this study aimed at determining the 
consistency or lack of it, of determinants of KAMs reported in Kenyan context from previous 
research finding, bearing in mind the diversity in geopolitical, socioeconomic and institutional 
contexts under study given previous research has mainly focussed on Western and European 
study. Thus, the results will enrich and supplement the current international debate on the 
determinants of KAMs in the independent auditor’s report. 
 
2.7. Chapter summary 
The expansion of independent auditors report to include KAMs could results in better quality 
audit and reduction of audit expectations gap. More disclosures to show that some key elements 
were analysed may make users feel more confident with the quality of financial reports as 
presented and, lead them to engage those charged with governance more constructively and 
ultimately make more informed investment decision. A few investors have confidence in such 
a beneficial outcome. For instance, reaction to CII (2014) contends that we could foresee 
"quality challenge among audit firms, especially in the area of professional scepticism, which 
strengthens the value of the audit to investors." Moreover, these key components are 
progressively becoming noticeable to users, which may potentially increase the costs to the 
auditor if problems occur with the reported elements subsequently. 
 
However, there is still lack of clarity in how auditors arriving at the KAMs they report given it 
is purely based on their judgement which is subjective. This is because there is no specific 
guidelines on nature of KAMs to report, how to report them and number of KAMs acceptable 











In this chapter, the research design, research philosophy, population, census, data collection 
and analysis are discussed. According to Kothari (2004), an appropriate research methodology 
should be adopted which explains the technical aspects of the research procedures in an 
understandable format. Ethical considerations of data collection and the quality of data are also 
outlined. 
 
3.2. Research Philosophy 
Researchers have developed four main research philosophical assumptions including: 
ontology, epistemology, axiology and methodology. In order to examine the three hypotheses 
forwarded in this study, the study adopted ontological assumption which concerns with human 
being and nature of world in the social contexts (Bryman, 2001). There are different 
presuppositions to see the world by outside individual and therefore effort is made to 
experience these realities through different perspectives of different individuals and through 
different experiences (Creswell, 2014). Therefore, ontology in normative emphasis that social 
phenomenon is independent from other factors. In this study, primary data was collected using 
questionnaires given to respondents, one-to-one in-depth interview and web-based 
questionnaires respectively.  
 
Philosophical assumptions are deeply rooted within various interpretive frameworks that 
researchers use when they conduct a study, including: positivism; post-positivism; interpretive; 
constructivism; transformative; and post-modernism among others (Creswell, 2014).This study 
will employ an interpretive research philosophical approach. In this research philosophy, the 
researcher pays critical attention on personal subjective significance about human beings 
conceiving logic of their environment and conveying meanings to it (Sarantakos, 2005). The 
major impact of this paradigm is that all the knowledge depends on the person interpreting it 
based on his or her experience and understanding. 
 
3.3. Research Design 
Descriptive research design (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2007) was adopted in this research. 
The design was aimed at accomplishing the study objectives by evaluating the determinants of 
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KAMs as reported in the enhanced audit report of companies listed in NSE in Kenya, through 
data collected based on a survey of auditors of these companies. Hypothesis testing was 
conducted to establish the relationship between the independent and dependent variables. 
 
This study used descriptive research design to enable researcher show influence, effect, 
relationships and associations between independent and dependent variables. Mugenda and 
Mugenda (2003) contended that descriptive studies are the best methods for gathering 
information which demonstrates the relationship and describes the existing situation. 
Quantitative analytical technique of regression equations was used to draw inference from the 
data collected regarding existing relationships in the variables of the study.  
 
3.4. Population 
Sekaran and Bougie (2011), contends that a population of study refers to all the people, objects 
or events of interest that the research investigator aspires to study. A population is therefore 
the entire group a researcher is interested in, to answer questions to a research study as well as 
to come up with conclusion concerning the same study. The target population of this study was 
auditors of all 11 firms,both big four and small and medium audit firms, involved in the audit 
of 65 listed companies in the Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE) for the period 2015 to 2017 
when the various enhancement of the audit report were implemented. The selection of NSE 
was based on ease of acquisition of audited financial reports and the fact that they are among 
the early adopters of enhanced audit reporting which is a requirement by the regulator, CMA. 
 
This study however differed from other prior studies going by the fact that it selected auditors 
of listed companies rather than investors to participate in the survey. This was premised on 
their professional training and their judgemental element in coming up with KAMs to report. 
It is believed that auditors would be more aware of determinants of KAMs reported in  
enhanced auditor’s report and its mechanisms, given they are the ones who come up with them 
and as such, provide a better assessment of their effectiveness in addressing audit expectations 
gap. 
 
3.5. Sampling Techniques 
Cooper and Schindler (2014) define sampling as the selection of a few members from total 
population to participate in a study. Few members are selected to represent the whole 
population in the study as there are practical or technical limitations that would limit the 
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inclusion of the whole population. Cohen, Manion and Morrison (2007) argued that the total 
expenditure for studying a whole population can be overwhelming and unfeasible to be 
incurred based on the researcher’s budgetary constraints.  
 
Both non-probability and probability sampling techniques were used in the study. In non-
probability sampling, purposive sampling was used because data is not readily available to the 
researcher due to the fact that it’s still a new area of study and target respondent group was 
already known. Purposive sampling was used to sample the participants relevant to this study 
who have knowledge about the determinants of KAMs reported expanded auditor’s report. 
They comprise of auditors from firms that audit companies listed in NSE. 
 
Simple random sampling, a probability technique, was used to sample the aforementioned 
participants for the study. The study settled for simple random sampling because according to 
Kothari (2004) it gives each component of the population equal chance of being picked up for 
the sample and all choices are independent from each other, given it’s a homogenous group. 
Moreover when compared to systematic random sampling, it does not portray the danger of 
order bias (Mugenda & Mugenda 2008). 
 
Limitation of the sampling techniques to be used is that, though quick and efficient methods of 
getting information, it cannot scientifically make generalizations about the total population 
from the sample because it would not be representative enough. This was thus subjective but 
will however guide in future research on the area of study. 
 
Most qualitative studies used purposive sampling since subjects was selected based on their 
expertise or experience in the subject. Different respondent categories were treated as a 
homogenous group hence a proportion of the same was gotten based on purposive sampling 
and size of audit firm to represent the group and achieve the census of all 65 listed companies 
and all the 11 audit firms found to have been involved in the audit of the listed companies in 
the period under study 2015 to 2017. Purposive sampling was done by allocating 20 
respondents to each of the big four audit firms given they conduct 86% of audits of all listed 
companies, and allocating 10 respondents to each of the small and medium audit firms to arrive 




3.6. Pilot Study 
Pilot testing was done to pre-test instruments to be used in data collection in order to eliminate 
ambiguity and improve its relevance to the study objectives (De Vaus, 2014). The pilot study 
involved 5% of the respondents translating to 3 respondents. The respondents were selected 
conveniently since statistical conditions are not necessary for pilot studies (Cooper & 
Schindler, 2003). 
 
Pilot study was meant to help refine research instruments; frame the questions appropriately; 
obtain relevant background information; ascertain the degree of observer bias and develop 
research procedures that ensure the respondents in the main research study do not have problem 
in answering the questions. Expert opinion was sought to comment on representativeness and 
fitness of the questions as well as make suggestions on the corrections to be made. 
 
The pilot study is intended to help in improving the content reliability and validity for the data 
to be collected. Questionnaires were sent electronically via Google forms to the respondents' 
place of work to ensure objective response and reduced non-response rate. Data from the pilot 
study was however not included in the final data analysis. 
 
3.7. Data Collection Methods 
Primary data was used in the study. The questionnaires were self-administered, sent via email 
or distributed online using a survey link as per respondent’s preference. These questionnaires 
were only sent after getting respondents acceptance to voluntarily participate in the study. The 
questionnaires were filled by auditors working or who have worked with firms involved in 
audit of companies listed in the NSE. 
 
Use of primary data is justified on the basis that it gives fundamental and original evidence 
(Sapsford &Jupp, 2006).Primary data is more dependable compared to secondary data since it 
is more reliable given that data is retrieved originally from the research field and not from 
secondary sources that can be prone to errors, inaccuracies or can even be outdated (Hox & 
Boeije, 2005). 
 
Questionnaire is used as a research instrument since it is both cost and time effective method 
of collecting data when compared to other research instruments (Kothari, 2004). The 
instrument gives the respondents adequate time to provide well thought answers compared to 
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other methods (Kothari, 2004). Moreover, it is free from interviewer`s biasness when compared 
to interviews and it covers a very large sample of participants when compared to interviews. 
Data was collected in May 2019. 
 
Structured questions include a Likert scale that is used to measure different aspects of the 
variables under study. Quantitative data was collected by use of semi-structured questionnaires. 
Unstructured questions were also included to provide the respondents with the freedom to 
capture any other important dimensions of the variables that they felt was missing (Williams, 
2003). 
 
The questionnaire consisted of two sections. Section A focused on the respondents’ profile, 
Section B focusing on determinants of KAMS, but with sub-sections addressing the various 
variables involved in the study. 
 
3.8. Data Analysis 
Data analysis is the application of statistical tools to process data into meaningful information. 
Quantitative data was be coded to assist in placing the responses in groups, according to 
categories presented in the questionnaire. This study used both descriptive and inferential 
statistical techniques to analyze data collected. The descriptive techniques comprised of 
frequencies, percentages, mean scores and standard deviation, whereas the inferential statistical 
tools will use Spearman’s rho correlation analysis, analysis of variance (ANOVA) and 
regression analysis. 
 
Based on cognitive psychology from comments by respondents, we draw inferences, 
conclusion and recommendations as to how auditor judgment is used at arriving at the KAM 
information in the auditor’s reports.In this research regression analysis was carried out whereby 
a model of a relationship was hypothesized in the form Υ= 𝛽0+ 𝛽1Χ+ 𝜀 where 𝛽0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛽1 are 
model parameters and 𝜀 is the probabilistic error term that accounts for any variability in Υ that 
cannot be described by the linear relationship with Χ (Cooper & Schindler, 2014). Independent 
variables dealing with determinants of KAMs were regressed against dependent variable which 
is KAMs to be included in the enhanced audit report. The equation was as shown below: 
 




KAMS – Key Audit Matters (Dependent variable) 
FS – Firm Size 
SUB – Subsidiaries 
AT – Auditor Type 
CL – Cross Listing Status 
IND – Industry 
TRY – Trend review over the years 
β1, β2, β3,β4, β5, β6= coefficients for which we are trying to predict the value of Υ 
β0= constant 
ε = Error term 
 
3.8.1. Testing the Models 
The following tests were performed and explained; correlation coefficient, the coefficient of 
determination, model fit (ANOVA) and regression coefficients. 
 
3.8.1.1. Correlation Coefficient (R) 
This helps the researcher to determine to what degree variable movements were associated. 
The correlation coefficient is usually within a range of values between -1 and 1 (Ronchetti, 
2018). A correlation of -1 indicates a perfect negative correlation while a correlation of 1 
indicates a perfect positive correlation. One of 0 indicates no relationship. The closer the 
correlation coefficient is towards -1 or 1, the stronger the association between the variables. 
 
3.8.1.2. The coefficient of Determination (𝑹𝟐) 
This enabled the researcher to explain how well the response variable variation was explained 
by the linear model. According to Allen (2004) when the differences between observed values 
and the model's predictions are small and unbiased, then the model is fit. 𝑅2 ranges from 0 to 





This enables the researcher to test whether the dependent variables were individually 
influenced by the independent variable. F-values can be obtained from the regression output 
and interpreted such that if the values are less than 0.05, then they are significant and should 
be included in the model, otherwise insignificant (Higgins, 2005). 
 
3.8.2. Diagnostic Tests 
3.8.2.1. Normality Tests 
The normality test of data collected was checked by conducting the Skewness-Kurtosis 
(Jarque-Bera) test for normality where the null hypothesis under this test is that the distribution 
of the data is not significantly different from that of a normal distribution. If the p-value is less 
than 0.05, the null of normality at the 5% level will be rejected. If variables are found not to be 




Multicollinearity was tested in the study using correlation matrix whereby the cut-off point for 
severe Multicollinearity is 0.8 (Gujarati, 2003; Cooper & Schindler, 2008). Variance inflation 
factor (VIF) was also used to measure multicollinearity since it is more conclusive than Pearson 
correlation coefficients. The assumption for multicollinearity states that, when the VIF value 
lies between 1 and 10, then there is no multicollinearity. Multicollinearity leads to large 
standard errors that affect the precision and accuracy results. 
 
3.8.2.3. Heteroscedasticity 
Since the data for this study is a cross-section of firms, this raises worries about the presence 
of heteroscedasticity. The CLRM expect that the error term is homoscedastic, that is, it has 
constant variance. On the off chance that the error variance isn't steady, at that point there is 
heteroscedasticity in the data. To test for heteroscedasticity, the Breusch-Pagan/Koenker test 
will be utilized. The null hypothesis of the study will be that the error variance is 
homoscedastic. On the off chance that the null hypothesis is rejected and a conclusion made 
that heteroscedasticity is available in the panel data, at that point this would be accounted for 




3.9. Reliability and Validity of the Research Model 
The research instruments were pre-tested in order to test and assess validity, reliability and 
objectivity of the research. Validity is the degree by which items in the research instrument 
represents the content the test is designed to measure (Mugenda and Mugenda, 2008). To 
establish the validity of the research instrument the researcher sought opinions of experts in 
audit and financial reporting as well as the researcher’s supervisor and lecturers.  
 
Reliability is a measure of degree to which a research instrument yields consistent and stable 
results or data after repeated trials (Eriksson and Kovalainen, 2015).The reliability and internal 
consistency was evaluated using Cronbach’s Alpha. The test is utilized to check if 
questionnaires with multiple Likert scale questions are reliable. SPSS software was used to 
compute the Cronbach’s Alpha. From the test, the overall reliability scale was 0.65 with the 
independent variables exhibiting the following coefficients of alpha: firm size (0.64), 
subsidiaries (0.57), and auditor type (0.63), cross listing status (0.59), Industry (0.58) and cross 
section of years (0.62). Gliem and Gliem (2003) recommended a value of 0.6 or greater as 
acceptable for the reliability test. 0.6 was the benchmark value the study used to test the 
reliability of the questionnaire. 
 
Objectivity ensures that the researcher should as far as possible remain distanced and 
independent from the study so that finding will depend on the nature of what was studied  rather 
than the personality, beliefs and values of the researcher (Payne & Payne, 2004). 
 
3.10. Data Presentation 
It encompasses the process of describing the disseminated dataset with the main variables 
covered, the breakdown and classifications used. The study used bar graphs, pie charts and 
frequency tables to present collected data. This is important because it gives a visual way to 
look at data. 
 
3.11. Ethical Issues 
In research ethics is important for two significant reasons. In the first place, ethics in research 
is critical to enhance the aims of the research such as knowledge, truth and avoidance of error. 
Second, since research regularly involves a great deal of cooperation and coordination among 
a wide range of individuals in various disciplines and organizations, ethical standards advance 
the qualities that are basic to communitarian work, for example, trust, responsibility, common 
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regard, mutual respect  and fairness. While undertaking our study the researcher ensured to 
abide by the ethical standards of research that includes getting voluntary informed consent from 
the respondents on the intended use of the research and procedures to be adopted in the data 
collection and analysis. The researcher ensured privacy and confidentiality of participants as 
well as sensitive data that may be shared. 
 
The conduct of this research was guided by Strathmore University’s code of ethics and 
permission to carry out the research was obtained from the university. Ethical issues concerning 
research subjects are confidentiality, privacy, anonymity, voluntary and informed consent 
(Saunders et al., 2015). The researcher ensured anonymity by separating the identity of 
individual firm from the information found. Therefore, in this research, the information 
gathered was regarded with high privacy and no disclosure was made beyond using the 

















FINDINGS AND DATA ANALYSIS 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter encompasses analysis and presentation of the research findings from results of 
primary data collected through questionnaires supplemented by interview guides. The data was 
collected from the auditors working for audit firms in Kenya. The findings addressed the 
determinants of KAMs as reported by companies by listed in the Nairobi stock exchange. 
Secondary data from annual reports was also reviewed by the researcher to help in 
understanding and rank the size of companies listed in NSE, the number of companies cross-
listed, those with subsidiaries and hence collaborate primary data. 
 
The findings are organized according to the objectives. First, the demographic information of 
respondents is presented followed by information responding to each of the specific objectives.  
The study had an anticipated sample size of 150 respondents but only 136 responded giving a 
response rate of 91% which was sufficient for analysis. The high response rate was as a result 
of adopting both manual and online questionnaires which could be accessed and completed 
even through WhatsApp. 
 
4.2. Demographic Information 
The study presents respondents information in terms of their gender, age, education, type of 
audit firms they have worked for, department they work in, experience and presence of audit 
committees in the firms they audited. 
 
4.2.1. Gender of respondents 
In terms of gender distribution, 76.5% were males and 23.5% were females. This shows that 















Figure 4.4.2.1.1: Distribution of respondents by gender 
 
 
4.2.2. Age of respondents 
The study targeted respondents of different age categories where both young and old were 
selected to participate in the study. On this note, 69.1% of the respondents were young people 
aged between 18 - 35 years, 16.2% of the respondents were aged between 36 – 50 years, while 
those who were above 50 years accounted for 14.7%as shown in Figure 4.2. This implies that 
more audit firms are getting younger auditors probably due to the rigorous work auditing 
involves.  
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4.2.3. Highest level of education 
The study further sought to establish the highest level of education the respondents had 
attained. In this regard, therefore, most of the respondents (64.7%) had university degrees while 
35.3% had master’s degree. Overall the respondents were qualified enough academically to 
understand the research topic and respond adequately. This indicates that all the auditors were 
qualified personnel with adequate knowledge and skills in auditing.  
 
Table 4.1: Highest level of education 
  Frequency Percent 
Degree 88 64.7 
Masters 48 35.3 
Total 136 100.0 
 
4.2.4. Type of audit firm worked on 
Majority of the respondents in this study (53.7%) reported that they had worked for the big 
four audit firms in Kenya which include Deloitte, Ernest & Young, PwC and KPMG. In 
addition, 41.9% reported to have worked with non-big four audit firms whereas 4.4% had 
worked with both the big four and non-big four audit companies. It therefore shows that the 
information presented in this study was from mostly those who have worked with the elite audit 
firms thus enhancing its quality.  
 
Figure 4.4.2.4.1: Type of audit firm respondents ever worked for 
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4.2.5. Years of experience 
In terms of years of experience in auditing, more than two thirds of the respondents reported to 
have worked in auditing between 3-5 years. Moreover, 14.0% reported experience of between 
6-8 years, followed by those who had 0-2 years of experience and those with more than ten 
years of experience (each 8.1%). This therefore shows that majority of the respondents had 
adequate audit experience to understand what KAMs are and how they are arrived at. 
 
Figure 4.4.2.5.1: Years of experience 
 
 
4.2.6. Audit committee 
Most of the companies that the respondents had audited (81.6%) had an audit committee 
whereas 14.4% of the respondents indicated that the companies they audited had no audit 
committees. This means that majority of the listed companies have a well-established 
governance structure that helps in oversight and to whom the auditor’s report on matters they 
deem significant from their audit. This however differs with secondary data obtained for the 
population from the regulatory, Capital Markets Authority (CMA), which showed it was 
mandatory for all listed companies to have an audit committee. Further study should be carried 



























Figure 4.1: Whether the company audited had an audit committee 
 
 
4.2.7. Effects of KAMs in Audit quality 
Respondents were asked whether enhancement of Auditor’s reports to include Key Audit 
Matters (KAMs) have made any contribution towards audit quality in the company. In response 
to this, 82.4% ascertained that indeed enhancement of Auditor’s reports to include Key Audit 
Matters (KAMs) had made contribution towards audit quality in companies while only 11.0% 
held a contrary view.  
 




Do you agree enhancement of Auditor’s reports to include Key Audit 




4.3. The content of KAMs reported by auditors in the enhanced auditors’ report 
The study tried to investigate the substance of KAMs reported in auditor’s report. The 
respondents were solicited to explain what was the content of KAMs they had reported and the 
greater part of them informed the study that KAMs included areas of higher assessed risk of 
material misstatement, or significant risks identified in accordance with ISA 315, significant 
auditor judgments relating to areas in the financial statements that involved significant 
management judgment, including accounting estimates, revenue recognition, valuation of 
Yes, 81.6%
No, 18.4%




assets, and valuation of actuarial liabilities that have been identified as having high estimation 
uncertainty.    
 
Figure 4.3.1: Content of Key Audit Matters 
 
 
In addition, it was reported that KAMs involves the effect on the audit of significant events or 
transactions that occurred during the period. It also looks at compliance, governance, conflict 
of interest (mostly on procurement) and fraud involving senior management, data migration, 
poor working capital as well as over-leverage. Other mentioned determinants of content of 
KAMs reported included business complexity (such as extent of reliance on technology) & the 
regulatory framework, nature of operations and impact of these matters on the performance 
and going concern of the company, materiality of the values in question, The level of risk, 
judgment and impact on the audit. 
 
However, the overall nature of KAM that will be reported is determined by the auditor’s 
professional judgment which decides on the issues that were of most significance in the audit 
of the financial statements of the current period, all this in consultation with those charged with 
governance. 
 
4.4. Drivers associated with reported KAMs by companies 
The study sought to establish the drivers of key audit matters in listed companies. Drivers 
explored, going by secondary data previously collected, include firm size, Subsidiaries, 
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Auditor's type, Cross listing status, Industry and Trend Review over Year. Here, the 
respondents were asked to give their level of agreement with statements regarding each of the 
drivers.  
 
4.4.1. Firm size 
The study was focused on determining effect of firm size on the nature of key audit matters 
reported. In this regard, respondents were required to give their level of agreement with 
statements on the effect of firm size on KAMs. Based on results presented on Table 4.3, the 
respondents tended to agree that the size of the organization by turnover determine the nature 
of Key Audit Matters (KAMs) reported as was indicated by a mean score of 3.46. Moreover, 
with a score of 3.63, most of the respondents indicated that the nature and number of Key Audit 
Matters reported in the audit report are discretionary on the auditor and are not determined by 
firm size. A mean score closer to 3 shows that the respondents were divided about an issue. In 
this way, the influence/ effect of the size of firm on the number of KAMs reported was not 
determined as the respondents were neutral about it (3.07). Moreover, the respondents were 
torn in between the influence of governance on KAMs. With a score of 3.29 there were neutral 
opinions on whether those charged with governance have an influence on number and nature 
of Key Audit Matters included in the audit report as shown in Table 4.3 below. A higher mean 
indicates that the variables have a major effect on KAMs while a low mean score implies that 
the aspect does not affect the number and nature of KAMs reported.  
 
Table 4.3: Level of agreement with statements regarding effects of firm size on KAMs 
  
Mean Std. Dev. 
The size of the organization by turnover determine nature of Key Audit Matters 
(KAMs) reported 3.46 1.053 
The bigger the firm the more the Key Audit Matters reported 
3.07 1.001 
The nature and number of Key Audit Matters reported in the audit report are 
discretionary on the auditor and not determined by firm size 3.63 1.108 
Those charged with governance have an influence on the number and nature of Key 
Audit Matters included in the audit report 3.29 1.408 
 
4.4.2. Subsidiaries 
The study sought to establish whether subsidiaries had any effect on determining the number 
and nature of key audit matter in a company. Based on the results in Table 4.4, there was 
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agreement among majority of the respondents that companies with subsidiaries report more 
Key Audit Matters than those without. The higher level of agreement is informed by the high 
mean score of 3.65. Although respondents had divided view on this, most of them were skewed 
towards the positive side. The results also revealed that the respondents had divided opinion 
on the nature and number of KAMs reported. In this view, with a mean of 3.15 the respondents 
did not conclusively give the effect of subsidiaries on the format and order of reporting KAMs. 
This implies that the number of KAMs may vary depending on whether the company has 
subsidiaries but the nature would be similar regardless of the presence of subsidiaries.  
 
Table 4.4: Level of agreement with statements regarding effects of subsidiaries on 
KAMs 
  
Observations Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Companies with subsidiaries report more Key Audit Matters than those 
without 136 3.65 0.783 
The nature and number of reporting Key Audit Matters is different 
depending on whether company has subsidiaries or not 136 3.15 1.060 
 
4.4.3. Auditor's type 
The study sought to determine the effects of auditor type on reporting of KAMs. The auditor 
type was categorized into two; the big four audit firms comprising of Deloitte, PwC, KPMG as 
well as Ernest & Young; and other audit firms. In regard to the influence of auditor type, there 
was almost unanimous agreement that areas requiring significant auditor’s judgment are the 
most reported topics under Key Audit Matters with a score of 4.10. This shows it is the 
discretion of the auditor to determine what qualifies to be reported as KAMs. On the other 
hand, there were varied opinions on difference in reporting KAMs between the big four and 
other audit firms. For instance, the respondents were neutral about the big 4 audit firms 
reporting different Key Audit Matters compared to other audit firms (a score of 3.16), it was 
also contested that the big four audit firms have a uniform format and order of reporting Key 
Audit Matters (3.22), and big four audit firms report more Key Audit Matters than other audit 
firms in any given audit (3.22). This implies that there is no difference in the manner which 
KAMs are reported and number of KAMs reported be it audit was done by a big four company 







Table 4.5: Level of agreement with statements regarding effects of auditor's type on 
KAMs 
  Mean Std. Dev. 
Big 4 audit firms tend to report different Key Audit Matters compared to other audit 
firms 3.16 1.266 
Big 4 audit firms have a uniform format and order of reporting Key Audit Matters 
3.22 1.001 
Big 4 audit firms report more Key Audit Matters than other audit firms in any given 
audit 3.22 1.093 
Areas requiring significant auditors judgment are the most reported topics under Key 
Audit Matters 4.10 .945 
 
4.4.4. Cross listing status 
On issues to do with cross listing of companies, it was revealed that companies that are cross 
listed have more Key Audit Matters reported than companies that are not(as indicated by a 
mean score of 3.43). In addition, with an average score of 3.95, respondents agreed that matters 
most significant to users of financial reports per jurisdiction are the most reported topics under 
KAMs, and there was agreement that the various regulatory environment for the cross listed 
companies determine Key Audit Matters reported (3.79) as shown in Table 4.6 below. This 
finding implies that various regulatory environment for the cross listed companies determine 
Key Audit Matters reported, cross listing status does not greatly influence the number of KAMs 
reported while KAMs mostly include matters that are of highest significance to the users of 
financial reports per jurisdiction.  
 
Table 4.6: Level of agreement with statements regarding effects of cross listing status on 
KAMs 
  Mean Std. Dev. 
Companies that are cross listed have more Key Audit Matters reported than companies 
that are not 3.43 1.066 
Matters most significant to users of financial reports per jurisdiction are the most 
reported topics under Key Audit Matters 3.95 .945 
The various regulatory environment for the cross listed companies determine Key Audit 




The study further sought to establish the effect of industry type on reporting of key audit 
matters. In this, the study focused on whether firms in the same industry reported similar key 
audit matters, whether KAMs were dependent on level of regulations in an industry and risk of 
material misstatement. Based on the findings, most respondents (83.1%) reported that 
organizations in the same industry tend to report similar KAMs, 87.5% agreed that areas with 
highest assessed risk of material misstatement in the financial reports per industry are the most 
reported topics under KAMs. Moreover, 81.6% of the respondents were in agreement that the 
level of regulation of an industry determines KAMs reported whereas 95.6% concurred that 
some industries tend to report more KAMs than others. 
 
Table 4.7: Level of agreement with statements regarding effects of industry on KAMs 
  Mean Std. Dev. 
Organizations in the same industry tend to report similar KAMs 
3.64 .814 
Areas with highest assessed risk of material misstatement in the financial reports per 
industry are the most reported topics under KAMs 4.15 .865 
The level of regulation of an industry determines KAMs reported 
4.01 .803 
Some industries tend to report more KAMs than others 
4.26 .534 
 
4.4.6. Trend review over years 
Generally, there is a gradual shift in the nature and number of KAMs reported over the years. 
With mean score of more than 4, it means that majority of the respondents agreed with the 
statements regarding effect of trend reviews over the years. For instance, it was agreed that the 
number of presentation of KAMs is changing over the years (4.29) meaning that more and 
more KAMs are reported with each year of audit. Moreover, it was indicated that the form and 
order of presentation of Key Audit Matters is changing over the years (4.32), the nature and 
drivers of Key Audit Matters reported are changing over the years (4.46), and that format of 
presentation of KAMs is becoming more standardized as years progress (4.48) as shown in 
table 4.8. The implication here is that the more companies get audited, the more KAMs are 




Table 4.8: Level of agreement with statements regarding effects of cross section of year 
on KAMs 
  Mean Std. Dev. 
The form and order of presentation of Key Audit Matters is changing over the 
years 4.32 0.641 
The nature and drivers of Key Audit Matters reported are changing over the years 
4.46 0.583 
More Key Audit Matters are being reported as years progress 
4.29 0.844 
The format of presentation of Key Audit Matters is becoming more standardized 
as years progress 4.48 0.769 
 
4.5. The nature and number KAMs reported in the enhanced audit reports 
In reporting the KAM, we start with the KAM in order of significance in terms of significant 
auditor’s judgement, significant risk, significant estimates and materiality.Majority of the 
respondents (90.5%) reported that the form and order of presentation of KAMs is changing 
over the years. In addition, 87.5% indicated that format of presentation of KAMs is becoming 
more standardized over time. All the respondents further reported that number of KAMs 
reported in enhanced auditor’s report vary from three to five and are dependent on key events 
and areas identified to have high risk during that year.  
 
4.6. Inferential analysis 
4.6.1.1. Normality Tests 
The normality of the data will be checked by conducting the Skewness-Kurtosis (Jarque-Bera) 
test for normality - null hypothesis under this test being that the distribution of the data is not 
significantly different from that of a normal distribution. For data to be normally distributed, 
the skewness value is between -1 and 1. The value is likewise required to be less than three 
times the standard error of skewness. This is also similar to the Kurtosis test. From the table 
























N Valid 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Skewness .060 -.233 -.290 -.577 .010 .051 -.892 
Std. Error of Skewness .208 .208 .208 .208 .208 .208 .208 
Kurtosis 1.076 -.859 -.327 -.218 -.063 .108 -.236 
Std. Error of Kurtosis .413 .413 .413 .413 .413 .413 .413 
 
4.6.1.2. Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity will be tested in the study using correlation matrix whereby the cut-off point 
for severe Multicollinearity is 0.8 (Gujarati, 2003; Cooper & Schindler, 2008). Variance 
inflation factor was also used to measure multicollinearity since it is more conclusive than 
Pearson correlation coefficients. The assumption for multicollinearity states that, when the VIF 
value lies between 1 and 10, then there is no multicollinearity. Multicollinearity leads to large 
standard errors that affect the precision and accuracy results. Based on the results below, all 
the VIF values lie between 1 and 10 thus there is no multicollinearity in the data. With a cut-






1 Firm size .813 1.230 
Subsidiaries .720 1.390 
Auditor's type .681 1.468 
Cross listing status .563 1.777 
Industry .517 1.933 
Cross Section & Year .725 1.379 
a. Dependent Variable: Key Audit Matters 
 
4.6.1.3. Heteroscedasticity 
The data for the study is from a cross-section of firms, thus raising the concerns about the 
existence of heteroscedasticity. The CLRM assumes that the error term is homoscedastic, that 
is, it has constant variance. If the error variance is not constant, then there is heteroscedasticity 
in the data. To test for heteroscedasticity, the Breusch-Pagan/Koenker test was used and results 





OLS outputs with heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors: 
  b  se  t  sig   95%LB  95%UB 
Constant    0.091 0.22 0.415 0.679 -0.287 0.47 
Firm size    0.146 0.025 5.736 0.000 0.101 0.192 
Subsidiaries    0.094 0.033 2.89 0.005 0.037 0.152 
Auditor type   0.256 0.029 8.793 0.000 0.203 0.309 
Cross listing  0.279 0.043 6.536 0.000 0.192 0.366 
Industry   0.078 0.047 1.675 0.096 -0.017 0.173 
Trend Review over Years  0.139 0.033 4.252 0.000 0.069 0.21 
* Note: standard error is HC4 variant 
 
Breusch-Pagan and Koenker test 
 
Breusch-Pagan and Koenker test statistics and sig-values  
    LM        Sig 
BP             17.637       .007 
Koenker        30.471       .000 
 
Null hypothesis: heteroscedasticity not present (homoscedasticity). 
 
If sig-value less than 0.05, reject the null hypothesis. 
 
Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that there is presence of 
heteroscedasticity in the data.  
 

















































































** .520** .593** .578** .592** .397** 
Sig. (2-tailed)   .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
A spearman’s rho correlation was carried out to establish the relationship between the 
dependent variable (Key Audit Matters) and the independent variables. The results showed 
positive relationships with the variables measured which were significant at p=0.01. The 
number and nature of KAMs were moderately correlated to the firm size (rho = 0.450). This 
implies that the bigger the firm, the more KAMs will be reported and vice versa. There was 
also a moderate correlation between KAMs and trend review over the years (rho = 0.397) 
meaning that KAMs would increase as the years progress. The results further revealed strong 
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positive correlations between KAMS and subsidiaries (rho = 0.520), auditor type (rho = 0.593), 
cross listing status (rho = 0.578) and the industry in which firm operates (rho = 0.592). This 
implies that an increase in any of the independent variables would significantly lead to increase 
in the dependent variable.  
 
4.6.3. Goodness of fit of the model 
Goodness of fit of the model refers to how well the model explains the variations in the 
dependent variable (Gujarati, 2012). It evaluates whether the model is good, reliable and valid 
to be used for prediction. In this study, the R squared, Standard error of estimate (S.E.) and the 
F-test statistic were used respectively to evaluate the goodness, reliability and validity of the 
various models. 
Coefficient of Determination 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .898a .806 .797 .226 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Cross Section & Year, Auditor's type, Cross listing status, Firm size, Subsidiaries, 
Industry 
 
Coefficient of Determination explains the degree to which the adjustment in the dependent 
variable can be explained by the adjustment in the independent variable or the percentage of 
variation in the dependent variable that is explained by all the independent variables. The 
coefficient usually lies between 0 and 1 whereby 0 indicates a complete lack of fit while 1 
indicates a perfect fit. Therefore the closer it is to 1 the better the fit. An R-square value of 
0.806 was established and adjusted to 0.797.The adjusted R squared is a better measure in this 
case because it is used to make comparison of a regression model that has the same dependent 
variable but different number of independent variables. This means that the independent 
variables could explain 79.7% of the key audit matters while only 20.3% of KAMs can be 
explained by factors not studied in this study. The standard error of estimate is the standard 
estimate of the deviation of the dependent variable about the regression line (Gujarati, 2012; 









Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 27.315 6 4.553 89.423 .000b 
Residual 6.567 129 .051   
Total 33.882 135    
a. Dependent Variable: Key Audit Matters 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Trend Review over the Year, Auditor's type, Cross listing status, Firm size, 
Subsidiaries, Industry 
 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was used to test the overall significance of the regression 
model. The null hypothesis for this test is that the independent variables do not have 
explanatory power (𝛽1=𝛽2=𝛽3=β4=β5=0). The p-Value of 0.001 means that the R squared is 
significantly greater than zero thereby our predictors are able to account for a significant 
amount of variance in key audit matters. With a significant p-value, we reject the null 
hypothesis and adopt the alternative hypothesis and conclude that the predictors have 
explanatory power. Therefore, the regression model is significant (F (6,135) = 89.423, p<0.001; 
R2 = 0.806).  
 






t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) .091 .193  .473 .637 
Firm size .146 .023 .271 6.312 .000 
Subsidiaries .094 .029 .146 3.206 .002 
Auditor's type .256 .027 .443 9.432 .000 
Cross listing status .279 .044 .326 6.304 .000 
Industry .078 .049 .086 1.604 .111 
Trend Review over 
Year 
.139 .036 .176 3.862 .000 
a. Dependent Variable: Key Audit Matters 
 




KAMs – Key Audit Matters 
FS - Firm size 
Sub – Subsidiaries 
AT - Auditor's type 
CL - Cross listing status 
TRY–Trend review over the years 
 
The results of linear regression showed that all the independent variables, except industry had 
effects on KAMs reported in enhanced audit report. In this regard, size of the firm being audited 
would increase the content, nature and number of KAMs by 0.146 points when other factors 
are held constant. The study further revealed that, all factors are kept constant, a unit increase 
in the number of subsidiaries would significantly increase KAMs by 0.094 points. Moreover, 
a unit increase in the stature of auditor type (the big four) would significantly increase nature 
and number of KAMs by 0.256 points. Besides, if a company is cross listed the content, nature 
and number of KAMs would significantly increase by 0.279 points other factors held constant. 
In addition, other factors controlled at zero, an increase in Trend review over years by 1 year 
would significantly increase the nature and number of KAMs by 0.139 points.  
 
4.7. Chapter Summary 
The study sought to examine the determinants of KAMs in the revised auditors report and 
impact of KAMs on audit quality and audit expectations gap using primary data collected from 
auditors who are the originators of this reports. The study began by discussing findings from 
the questionnaires under response rate, demographic characteristics and descriptive results 
from specific question on the questionnaire about each driver of KAMs studied, that is, Firm 
size, Subsidiary, Auditor type, Industry, Cross listing and trend review over years. A 
correlation analysis was then applied to determine association between the independent and 
dependent variable as shown in the conceptual framework and fitness for purpose of the model 
for the study being done. Finally these variables were put in a regression model to determine 







DISCUSSION, SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter presents the summary of findings, conclusion and recommendations from the 
study. The research findings were summarized as per the research objectives outlined in chapter 
one of the study. This chapter also provides recommendations and suggestions on areas of 
further study in regards to KAMs. 
 
5.2. Discussion of Findings 
The study was carried out in May 2019 among auditors working with various audit firms within 
Kenya. The main of the study being to identify determinants of KAMs reported in audit reports 
of 65 listed companies in the Nairobi Securities Exchange. 
 
5.2.1. The content of KAMs reported by auditors in the enhanced auditors’ report 
From the first objective, the study findings explored the content of KAMs as reported by 
auditors in revised audit report. The substance of KAMs reported is simply founded on the 
auditors’ judgment after consultation with management and board audit committee. The study 
revealed that KAMs included areas of higher assessed risk of material misstatement, or as 
alluded to by ISA 315, areas of significant auditor judgments, areas of significant management 
judgment, including accounting estimates, revenue recognition, valuation of assets, and 
valuation of actuarial liabilities. Content of KAMs additionally included the impact on the 
review of noteworthy occurrences during period under review. It additionally takes a look at 
compliance, governance, conflict of interest (mostly on procurement) and fraud involving 
senior management, data migration, poor working capital as well as over-leverage.  
 
Much as it is a great idea to incorporate KAMs in the audit report, the inclusion of additional 
disclosure may also affect users’ perception of the audit, more so in regards to audit quality, 
comparability and uniformity across organizations or audit areas. As Bédard et al., (2014) 
revealed, the disclosure of such information has more of a symbolic than an informative value. 
Hatherly, Brown, and Innes (1998) in fact recommend that additional communications in the 




In summary, from the study done, the content of KAMs reported was found to be mainly 
judgemental by the auditor but guided by the International Standards of Auditing general 
guidelines and also consultations with those charged with governance. This element of 
consultation with those charged with governance puts on the line the auditors independence 
given his/her judgement might be impaired depending on the kind of relationship the auditor 
has with the directors of the company. 
 
5.2.2. Drivers associated with reported KAMs by companies listed in the NSE 
In regard to the second objective which sought to investigate the drivers associated with 
reported KAMs by companies listed in the NSE, the findings showed that all the drivers studied 
had positive effect on KAMs. The results showed positive relationships with the variables 
measured which were significant at p=0.01. The number and nature of KAMs were moderately 
correlated to the firm size (rho = 0.450) and cross section of years (rho = 0.397); strong positive 
correlations between KAMS and subsidiaries (rho = 0.520), auditor type (rho = 0.593), cross 
listing status (rho = 0.578) and the industry in which firm operates (rho = 0.592). The positive 
correlation between KAMs and the various drivers studied implies that an increase in any of 
the independent variables would significantly lead to increase in the dependent variable. 
However, as Daske, Hail, Leus & Verdi (2011) pointed out that the communication of KAMs 
does not necessarily increase the perceived level of audit quality, but rather even lowered it 
going by one of experiments conducted. This is because driver of KAMs reported which are 
the international standards and legislations developed for various jurisdictions are general in 
nature hence giving leeway to auditors’ judgement to justification of inclusion or omission of 
KAMs in the report.  
 
This study focused on the firm size, subsidiaries, auditor type, cross listing status, industry type 
and cross section of years as the main drivers of nature and number of KAMs. An R-square 
value of 0.806 was established and adjusted to 0.797. This means that independent variables 
could explain 79.7% of the key audit matters while only 20.3% of KAMs can be explained by 
factors not studied in this study. There is therefore need for more research to establish what 
these other variables that determine the nature are and number of KAMs as reported by the 
auditors in their report given there is no specific standards or guidelines stipulating the drivers. 
 
Furthermore, the correlation testing for drivers of KAMs showed that firm size has moderate 
positive correlation to the nature and number of KAMs reported as compared to the other 
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drivers that have strong positive correlation. This means to show that auditors are not really 
guided by size of company to decide KAMs to report but by other factors like materiality and 
risk element. The cross section of years also has moderate positive correlation to the KAMs 
reported meaning there has not been much progress or development in improving KAMs to 
make them more informative or communicative as initially envisioned.  
 
5.2.3. The nature and number KAMs reported in the enhanced audit reports 
In regards to third objective of the study, which sought to assess nature and number KAMs 
reported in the enhanced audit reports of companies. IAASB, while clarifying audit standards 
with a focus of improving audit reporting and quality agreed on more disclosure to increase 
transparency and thus address the audit expectations gap. Moreover, to display transparency of 
the audit process and enhance the communicative value of the engagement, the auditor is 
expected to disclose KAMs in the auditor`s report per ISA 701. This helps throw light on the 
auditor`s judgment basis and highlights key issues he/she feels ought to be communicated to 
users.  
 
While there is no guideline as to how to present the KAMs and how many KAMs should be in 
a given audit report, all the respondents further reported that number of KAMs reported in 
enhanced audit report vary from three to five and are dependent on key events and areas 
identified to have high risk during that year. It is auditors mandate to determine which of the 
matters are considered to be most significant in the audit reviews and hence decide which 
matter to report as KAM and which to leave in the management letter. Therefore, going by this 
criteria of deciding on what qualifies to be KAM and also guided by other factors such as 
complexity and size of the company, nature of client business and environment, the auditor 
might end up with very many or very few KAMs (Cordoş & Fülöp, 2015).This is also 
dependent on the judgement of the auditor due to lack of guideline as to how to present the 
KAMs and how many KAMs should be reported. 
 
The issue of legal liability to auditors out of their audit report more so inclusion or omission of 
some KAMs that users deem key is a real exposure on the auditors, even in the Kenyan context. 
The shareholder plaintiffs’ lawyers will be salivating over the documentary record to be created 
under the revised PCAOB’s and IAASB inspection process, and the four-layered mischief to 
be inflicted by its deficiency-seeking process (Shaikh and Talha, 2003). Auditors being alive 
to this risk are working on mitigating it and very soon, every audit firm will be found to have 
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some minimum number of KAMs while defensive reporting will prevail. This will ultimately 
be counter-productive to the original intention of KAMs. 
 
This thus explains why the audit report especially for the big four are tending to take a 
standardized format as they seek to mitigate on the exposure. This has also led the audit firms 
especially the big for to reporting more KAMs than the small firms as they try to cover 
themselves from liability where there is a risk. 
 
5.3. Conclusion 
The study’s broad objective was to understand the determinants of KAMs in the revised audit 
report and impact of KAMs on the audit expectations gap. First objective explored the content 
of KAMs reported by auditors in the enhanced audit report and it was noted that the content of 
KAMs reported is purely based on the auditors’ judgement after discussion with management 
and board audit committee. The study revealed that most reported KAMs included areas of 
higher assessed risk of material misstatement in accordance with ISA 315, areas of significant 
auditor judgments and areas of significant management judgment, including accounting 
estimates, revenue recognition, valuation of assets, and valuation of actuarial liabilities that 
have been identified as having high estimation uncertainty. 
 
In regard to the second objective which sought to investigate the drivers associated with 
reported KAMs by companies listed in the NSE, all the drivers studied had positive effect on 
KAMs. The driver of KAMs reported which are the international standards and legislations 
developed for various jurisdictions are general in nature hence giving leeway to auditors’ 
judgement and justification of inclusion or omission of KAMs in the report. The number and 
nature of KAMs were moderately correlated to the firm size (rho = 0.450); positively and 
strongly correlated to subsidiaries (rho = 0.520), auditor type (rho = 0.593), cross listing status 
(rho = 0.578) and the industry in which firm operates (rho = 0.592). This would therefore mean 
that an increase in any of the independent variables would significantly lead to increase in the 
dependent variable. The drivers studied however represent 79.7% of the driver of what guide 
auditors in deciding what KAMs to report. There are still other 20.3% variables that also guide 
auditors in their judgement but were not included in this study. 
 
The third objective sought to assess the nature and number KAMs reported in the enhanced 
audit reports of companies. Even though there is no guideline as to how to present the KAMs 
63 
 
and how many KAMs should be in a given audit report, all the respondents further reported 
that the number of KAMs reported in enhanced audit report vary from three to five and are 
dependent on key events and areas identified to have high risk during that year. In this regard, 
therefore, the auditor is allowed to communicate KAMs in the audit report per ISA 701 in order 
to display transparency of the audit and enhance the communicative value of the engagement 
in whatever way he/she deems fit, but taking care not to introduce information overload which 
is counterproductive.  
 
5.4. Recommendations 
While the study has established that firm size, subsidiaries, auditor type, cross listing status, 
industry type and cross section of years have effect to the nature and number of KAMs reported 
in enhanced audit report it suggests the following recommendations based on its findings: 
 
There is need to develop guidelines on the nature and number of KAMs reported in auditor’s 
report. 
There is also need to develop guidelines on nature and level of consultation between the auditor 
and board audit committee before arriving at KAMs to report to ensure auditors independence 
is protected at all times. 
There is need to harmonize reporting of KAMs across the audit profession. This is because the 
big four audit firms tend to have their own way of reporting KAMs. They also tend to report 
more KAMs than other audit firms.  
 
5.5. Limitations of the research 
The first limitation of the study is that as a result of using questionnaires to collect data, there 
was non-response and thus had to extend my data collection period as I followed up with my 
intended respondents thus causing delay in finalizing the research. The other limitation was 
that the study excluded companies not listed in the Nairobi Securities Exchange despite them 
being the majority. Another limitation was in the tool of analysis used i.e. regression. The 
regression analysis tool has various assumptions such as linearity which assumes that 
relationship between the dependent and independent variable is linear. 
 
5.6. Contribution to Knowledge 
This study sought to build on to the agency theory by determining impact of the KAMs as 
reported by auditors to the users for annual report in reducing audit expectations gap. The study 
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also sought to build on signalling theory by determining the impact of nature and number of 
KAMs reported on guiding the users of annual report to better understand them without getting 
information overload. Additionally, the study sought to add to the existing body of knowledge 
by highlighting the drivers of KAMs reported in Kenya where scanty research has been done 
in relation to KAMs in Kenya. Further, the study sought the views of industry players in an 
attempt to better understand the basis of decision making while coming up with KAMs. 
 
5.7. Suggested areas for further research 
Further study can be conducted to determine effects of firm profitability, corporate governance 
as well as Market performance (Stock Liquidity) on KAMs reported in enhanced audit reports.  
 
There is also need for further research to establish the other 20.3% drivers for determining 
KAMs reported, other than the ones studied in this research. 
Finally from the study, there has also been noted area of possible conflict between auditors and 
those in charge of company oversight, in this case being board audit committee and hence need 
to do further study on effects of consulting those charged with governance, before deciding on 
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APPENDIX II: THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
This questionnaire is a data collection tool for the study, “Examination of the determinants of 
KAMs reported by companies listed in the Nairobi Securities Exchange, Kenya.” 
Kindly answer the questions by putting a tick (√) in the appropriate box or by writing in the 
space provided. 
Confidentiality 
All the information collected will be treated with utmost confidentiality and used only for 
academic purposes. In addition, no reference shall be made to any company or respondent. 
SECTION A: DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION 
 
Name of respondent (optional) …………………. 
Name of Company ……………… 
1. What is your age? 
a. 18 – 35 years  [  ] 2. 36- 50 years [  ] 3. Above 50 years  [  ] 
2.   Gender of respondent 
1. Male [  ] 2. Female [  ] 
3. What is the highest level of education you have attained?  
a. Certificate [  ] 2. Diploma [  ] 3. Degree [  ] 4. Masters [  ] 5. PhD [  ] 
4. Which department do you work in? 
a. Audit [  ] 2. Tax [  ] 3. Financial Advisory   4. Other [  ] 
5. For how long have you been working in this department? 
a. 0 -2 years [  ] 2. 3 – 5 years [  ] 3. 6 – 8 years [  ] 4. 9 – 10 years [  ]  
5. Above 10 years [  ] 
6. Does the company you audited have an audit committee?  
1. Yes[  ]   2. No[  ] 
7. Do you agree enhancement of Auditor’s reports to include KAMs have made any 
contribution towards audit quality in the company? 
a. Strongly disagree [  ] 2. Disagree [  ] 3. Neutral [  ] 4. Agree [  ]  




8. In your opinion, what do you think is the impact of including KAMs in the enhanced 
auditors report in respect to companies you have audited? 
 
9. What is the content of KAMs reported in listed companies you have audited? 
 
10. What determines nature of KAMs reported in these companies? 
 
11. What is the nature and number of KAMs reported in the company you audited? 
 
 
SECTION B: DETERMINANTS OF KAMS  
The following statements relate to determinants of KAMs. State the extent to which you 
agree with the following statements with regards to enhanced Auditor’s reports in a listed 
corporation you have audited (where 1-strongly disagree, 2-diasagree, 3-neutral, 4agree, and 
5-strongly agree). 
Variables  Parameters Respondents Ranking of Parameter 
Independent Variables 1= S D 2= D 3 = N 4= A 5= S A 
Key Audit Matters (KAM) 
a) Firm Size 
i. The size of the organization by turnover 
determine content of KAMs reported. 
 
     
ii. The bigger the firm the more the KAMs 
reported. 
 
     
iii. The nature and number of reporting 
KAMs in the audit report are 
discretionary on the auditor and not 
determined by firm size. 
     
iv. Those charged with governance have an 
influence on the number and nature of 
KAMs included in the audit report. 




v. Companies with subsidiaries report more 
KAMs that those without. 
     
vi. The nature and number of reporting 
KAMs is different depending on whether 
company has subsidiaries or not. 
     
c) Auditors Type 
vii. Big 4 audit firms tend to report different 
KAMs compared to other audit firms. 
     
viii. Big 4 audit firms have a uniform format, 
nature and number of reporting KAMs. 
     
ix. Big 4 audit firms report more KAMs than 
other audit firms in any given audit. 
     
x. Areas requiring significant auditors 
judgement are the most reported topics 
under KAMs 
     
d) Cross Listing Status 
xi. Companies that are cross listed have 
more KAMs reported that companies that 
are not 
     
xii. Matters most significant to users of 
financial reports per jurisdiction are the 
most reported topics under KAMs 
     
xiii. The various regulatory environment for 
the cross listed companies determine 
KAMs reported 
     
e) Industry 
xiv. Organizations in the same industry tend 
to report similar KAMs 
     
xv. Areas with highest assessed risk of 
material misstatement in the financial 
reports per industry are the most reported 
topics under KAMs 
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xvi. The level of regulation of an industry 
determines KAMs reported 
     
xvii. Some industries tend to report more 
KAMs than others. 
     
f) Trend of Reporting over Year      
xviii. The nature and number of presentation of 
KAMs is changing over the years. 
     
xix. The content and drivers of KAMs 
reported are changing over the years. 
     
xx. More KAMs are being reported as years 
progress. 
     
xxi. The format of presentation of KAMs is 
becoming more standardized as years 
progress. 
     
 
Thank you for your participation. 
 
 
